OUT, OUT—THE ROLE OF MESSAGING IN COUNTERING DOMESTIC VIOLENT EXTREMISM by Roberts, Kathryn M.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2020-03
OUT, OUTTHE ROLE OF MESSAGING IN
COUNTERING DOMESTIC VIOLENT EXTREMISM
Roberts, Kathryn M.
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/64873
Copyright is reserved by the copyright owner.








OUT, OUT—THE ROLE OF MESSAGING  
IN COUNTERING DOMESTIC VIOLENT EXTREMISM 
by 
Kathryn M. Roberts 
March 2020  
Thesis Advisor: Mohammed M. Hafez 
Second Reader: Anders Strindberg (contractor) 
 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE  Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 
information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions 
for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson 
Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.




3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master’s thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
OUT, OUT—THE ROLE OF MESSAGING IN COUNTERING DOMESTIC 
VIOLENT EXTREMISM
5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S) Kathryn M. Roberts
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)











11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
 Countering the radical Islamist narrative remains a high-profile priority of the United States in its 
ongoing efforts to counter domestic violent extremism. Since mid-2014, government officials have 
condemned the United States as unable to muster a satisfactory “counter-narrative,” and emphasize the 
potentially devastating consequences of failure. Experts inside and outside the government describe the 
Islamic State as masters of the internet capable of reaching into the United States and turning its people into 
hate-filled, violently inspired terrorists at will. The idea that the United States must aggressively work to 
counter these messages domestically remains a given; but should it? The focus of this thesis is to examine 
current U.S. efforts in counter-messaging to determine why the United States believes it is failing, and what, 
if any, evidence supports the idea that a counter-narrative or counter-messaging should be part of domestic 
countering violent extremism (CVE) programs. Review of official documents found little basis to assess 
U.S. programs, as no meaningful published strategy, objectives, or performance data exist for current efforts. 
Moreover, the foundational assumptions underlying current programs suggest malalignment between what 
U.S. officials desire a counter-messaging effort to accomplish and what is realistically achievable. Based on 























NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
i 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
ii 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
OUT, OUT—THE ROLE OF MESSAGING IN COUNTERING DOMESTIC 
VIOLENT EXTREMISM 
Kathryn M. Roberts 
Senior Analyst, FEMA, Department of Homeland Security 
BA, University of Wisconsin–La Crosse, 2008 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES  
(HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE) 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
March 2020  
Approved by: Mohammed M. Hafez 
 Advisor 
 Anders Strindberg 
 Second Reader 
 Erik J. Dahl 
 Associate Professor, Department of National Security Affairs 
iii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
iv 
ABSTRACT 
Countering the radical Islamist narrative remains a high-profile priority of the 
United States in its ongoing efforts to counter domestic violent extremism. Since 
mid-2014, government officials have condemned the United States as unable to muster a 
satisfactory “counter-narrative,” and emphasize the potentially devastating consequences 
of failure. Experts inside and outside the government describe the Islamic State as 
masters of the internet capable of reaching into the United States and turning its people 
into hate-filled, violently inspired terrorists at will. The idea that the United States must 
aggressively work to counter these messages domestically remains a given; but should it? 
The focus of this thesis is to examine current U.S. efforts in counter-messaging to 
determine why the United States believes it is failing, and what, if any, evidence supports 
the idea that a counter-narrative or counter-messaging should be part of domestic 
countering violent extremism (CVE) programs. Review of official documents found little 
basis to assess U.S. programs, as no meaningful published strategy, objectives, or 
performance data exist for current efforts. Moreover, the foundational assumptions 
underlying current programs suggest malalignment between what U.S. officials desire a 
counter-messaging effort to accomplish and what is realistically achievable. Based on 
these findings, it is recommended that domestic CVE programs eliminate counter-
messaging from their portfolio. 
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Countering the radical Islamist narrative remains a high priority of the United States 
in its ongoing efforts to counter domestic violent extremism. In 2014, the rapid emergence 
of the Islamic State (IS) brought the idea of narratives to the forefront of public discussion. 
As the first terrorist organization to leverage social network platforms to their full potential 
for its strategic communications, IS and its graphic, taunting messages captured the 
attention and imagination of the world. Experts inside and outside government described 
IS as a uniquely gifted adversary capable of reaching into the United States and turning its 
people into violent terrorists from afar. These same officials also condemned the U.S. as 
unable to effectively challenge these messages, emphasizing the potentially devastating 
consequences of this failure.  
The idea that strategic communications is essential to terrorism is certainly not new. 
In a prescient 2005 letter sent by Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, al-
Zawahiri wrote, “I say to you: that we are in a battle, and that more than half of this battle 
is taking place in the battlefield of the media.”1 However, in 2014, the tactics of 
communication felt new and the U.S. government seemed ill prepared to respond. An 
assessment by Boyle and Kallmyer from the Broadcasting Board of Governors captures 
the general sentiment in Washington at the time well, “The information front against 
terrorist organizations is now of vital strategic significance, and the U.S. government was 
initially caught unprepared.”2  
Given the extensive historical experience of the United States in strategic 
communications and wartime strategic influence campaigns, this perception of failure is 
 
1 Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat (New 
York: Random House, 2007), 28. 
2 Robert Boyle and Kevin Kallmyer, “Combatting the Islamic State’s Digital Dominance: Revitalizing 
U.S. Communication Strategy,” The Washington Quarterly 39, no. 1 (January 2, 2016): 29–48, DOI: 
10.1080/0163660x.2016.1170478. 
xvi 
somewhat surprising.3 Countering IS was a top national security and defense priority 
throughout the Obama administration. The National Security Strategy 2015 specifies that 
the U.S. will “support alternatives to extremist messaging” and “undertake a 
comprehensive effort to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL.”4 A summit on countering 
violent extremism (CVE) held at the White House also explicitly addressed counter-
narratives, and in conjunction with that summit, the White House announced dedicated 
staffing and additional funding for the overall CVE program.5 Yet, throughout 2015 and 
2016, the belief of failure in Washington held firm. It begs the question, as a top White 
House priority, with resources and experience committed to the cause, why would 
government efforts fail?  
This thesis began with an attempt to answer this deceptively simple question: is the 
U.S. really failing at efforts to counter-message radical Islamism? From the onset, 
significant challenges arose in finding an answer; first and foremost, there seems to be no 
meaningful strategy for counter-messaging. In 2011, the White House published a strategy 
entitled Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States 
with an accompanying Strategic Improvement Plan (SIP) that tasked multiple federal 
agencies with a variety of “strategic” deliverables, some of which include counter-
messaging. However, no specific goals, performance measures, or evaluation plans were 
 
3 The United States ran extensive strategic communications campaigns during WWI, WWII, Vietnam, 
and the Gulf War. For more information on historical U.S. strategic communications efforts, see James 
Farwell and John J. Hamre, Persuasion and Power: The Art of Strategic Communications (Washington, 
DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012); Bryan Freeman, “The Role of Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, 
and Psychological Operations in Strategic Information” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005), 
15–36.  
4 White House, National Security Strategy 2015 (Washington, DC: White House, 2015), 9–10, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf. 
Similar language is also present to show continuity into the Trump administration. White House, National 
Security Strategy 2017 (Washington, DC: White House, 2017), 15, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-cont 
ent/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. 
5 White House Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: The White House Summit on Countering Violent 
Extremism,” February 18, 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/18/fact-
sheet-white-house-summit-countering-violent-extremism. 
xvii 
provided, nor did the SIP direct coordination efforts across these agencies.6 The result is 
unsurprising. In 2016, Congress commissioned a comprehensive review of CVE efforts by 
the Government Accountability Office (GAO), which found no “cohesive strategy” or 
“measurable outcomes” across the government, despite the 2011 plan.7 The report says:  
The federal government does not have a cohesive strategy or process for 
assessing the overall CVE effort. Although GAO was able to determine the 
status of the 44 CVE tasks, it was not able to determine if the United States 
is better off today than it was in 2011 as a result of these tasks.8  
Without a strategy to review or any supporting data, there is no basis upon which 
to authoritatively evaluate the existing programs. Put alternatively, it is inappropriate to 
call these efforts a failure because it is not possible to answer the question: failing at what. 
A natural outgrowth of this initial finding is why then does the U.S. believe it is failing? 
What was it hoping to accomplish that seems, as of yet, unattained?  
Exploration of this second question requires a deep look into the ideas and 
assumptions underlying current and desired efforts in counter-messaging. The purpose of 
this thesis is to answer this second question, why does the U.S. believe it is failing, along 
with another, under what conditions could it succeed? Or simply put, what is the U.S. trying 
to accomplish and how accomplishable are these goals? To address these two points, 
research for this study is conducted in two phases.  
First, a review of official documents, including testimony, public statements by 
relevant departments or their senior leaders, websites, and reports is performed to construct 
 
6 The SIP says “we will coordinate activities, where appropriate, to support the CVE effort” but it does 
not say who the “we” is; no one is explicitly overseeing plan implementation writ large, although the 
National Security Staff and an Interagency Policy Committee are referenced in some places as architects of 
the plan and could ostensibly be those responsible for its execution. Later, the plan outlines how each task 
has a lead agency, in many cases several of them, responsible for coordinating the task, which appears to 
leave no one at the head of the project with visibility across all tasks and may account for the GAO findings 
presented in the 2017 report.  
7 Government Accountability Office, Countering Violent Extremism, Actions Needed to Define 
Strategy and Assess Progress of Federal Efforts, GAO-17-300 (Washington, DC: Government 
Accountability Office, 2017), 16. 
8 Government Accountability Office, 2. 
xviii 
a “most-likely” set of objectives for counter-messaging.9 Working with these objectives, 
root cause analysis is used to identify assumptions and ideas that underlie them and they 
are organized into a framework for analysis.  
Second, in phase two, this framework of ideas is critically examined against a 
comprehensive literature review to identify potential areas where expectations are 
unrealistic or underlying assumptions do not align with the collective knowledge of 
relevant academic disciplines. Many disciplines can contribute to an understanding of 
communications as it relates to terrorism; however, this study focuses on five where clear, 
direct association is evident: political communications, strategic communications, political 
science, sociology, and terrorism studies. In the case of each objective and its associated 
assumptions and ideas, these five disciplines are consulted for their respective wisdom on 
two questions: is it an achievable or appropriate goal for homeland security or law 
enforcement officials, and if so, is counter-messaging the most fitting tool to achieve this 
goal? In the end, very little evidence suggests yes for any of the objectives reviewed.10  
Ultimately, it appears that rather than a failure of execution, the critical problem 
with U.S. counter-messaging is a failure of understanding and a misalignment of tactics to 
desired outcomes. While on its face it seems simple enough to accept that if an adversary 
is putting out messages that may have negative consequences, it is a good idea to counter 
them; as it turns out, this is not necessarily the case, and in fact, introducing counter-
messages may result in the exact opposite of what the messenger wants.11 It takes a deeper 
understanding of how messages are sent and received by individuals and groups, how 
narratives are intertwined with individual and group identity, how radicalization occurs, 
and the difference between radicalization and mobilizing to violence to recognize the flaws 
 
9 Two points can be made. First, these objectives are used to encompass both what it supposed to be 
done and also what it wants to accomplish (so it includes the assumed desirable outcome). Second, it is 
necessary to depart from the published “strategic objectives” outlined in the 2011 document because they 
are not strategic.  
10 The objectives are presented for the first time in Chapter IV. 
11 Kate Ferguson, Countering Violent Extremism through Media and Communication Strategies (Bath, 
England: Partnership for Conflict, Crime, and Security Research, 2016), 9, http://www.paccsresearch.org. 
uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Countering-Violent-Extremism-Through-Media-and-Communication-
Strategies-.pdf; Kris Christmann, Preventing Religious Radicalisation and Violent Extremism: A Systematic 
Review of the Research Evidence (London: Youth Justice Board for England and Wales, 2012), 30. 
xix 
in the current thinking about counter-messaging. This paper provides this needed context 
and concludes by offering suggestions on the potential scope and limitations of domestic 
counter-messaging campaigns moving forward.12  
  
 
12 Although this study focuses specifically on radical Islamism, it is worth noting that its findings can 
also apply more broadly to any identity-based political movement. Narratives are an essential component of 
identity politics, and so, how the U.S. government chooses to address the issue of narrative is critical when 
considering those groups. Radical Islam is one example of many.  
xx 
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Words are, in my not so humble opinion, our most inexhaustible source of 
magic, capable of both inflicting injury and remedying it. 
—Albus Dumbledore, Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows 
 
This is a story about stories: how they were built, who told them, what they said, 
why they might have said it, and so on. For some time, the U.S. government has been 
telling a story about the threat from a terrorist organization in Iraq called the Islamic State 
of Iraq and Syria/and the Levant (ISIS/ISIL/Daesh), hereafter IS, that goes something like 
this: a group of terrorists is cleverly using propaganda in the digital space to infect people 
with radical ideas that will cause them to travel overseas and join this new state, or if that 
fails, murder people in their hometowns in the name of faith. In some sense or another, this 
underlying worry that IS propaganda could or would create a surge of terrorist attacks in 
the homeland persisted for several years.1 In 2016, then Director of the FBI James Comey, 
testified before Congress: 
Unlike other groups, ISIL has constructed a narrative that touches on all 
facets of life from career opportunities to family life to a sense of 
community. The message isn’t tailored solely to those who are overtly 
expressing symptoms of radicalization. It is seen by many who click 
through the Internet every day, receive social media push notifications, 
and participate in social networks. Ultimately, many of these individuals 
are seeking a sense of belonging. Echoing other terrorist groups, ISIL has 
advocated for lone offender attacks in Western countries. Recent ISIL 
videos and propaganda specifically advocate for attacks against soldiers, 
law enforcement, and intelligence community personnel. Several incidents 
have occurred in the United States, Canada, and Europe that indicate this 
“call to arms” has resonated among ISIL supporters and sympathizers 
(emphasis mine).2 
 
1 Depending on your perspective, it can be argued that this worry still exists, although somewhat 
lessened by the territorial losses the group experienced in 2017.  
2 James Comey, “Fifteen Years after 9/11: Threats to the Homeland, Statement before the Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Washington, D.C.,” FBI News, September 
27, 2016, https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/fifteen-years-after-911-threats-to-the-homeland. 
2 
In this single statement, Director Comey reveals much about the thinking that drove 
government policy related to IS, especially concerning counter-messaging and the need for 
a counter-narrative.3 Notably, this testimony seems to suggest that “regular” people doing 
their online shopping might somehow be convinced to pull off terrorist attacks in the 
homeland, as demonstrated by the vague examples referenced. In his defense, the Director 
would probably say drawing such conclusions from his testimony is oversimplifying a 
complex problem; and if it were a unique or one-off comment, one might be inclined to 
agree. Except, this kind of oversimplification is not present in just one statement; it is found 
in numerous reports, fact sheets, official documents, and testimony and speeches from 
multiple leaders across multiple administrations. The ideas it captures are woven into all 
current Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programs and policy, and the question that 
ought to have been asked but apparently never was is: is any of this true? 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Today, the United States remains engaged in the longest war in its history. Over the 
course of engagement, the enemy has evolved in name but not in ideology. IS is the latest 
disenfranchised insurgent group with anti-U.S. global ambitions in the unstable region 
around the Tigris-Euphrates Valley. Sweeping decisively across Iraq and Syria in 2014, at 
its prime, IS commanded over 55,000 square miles of territory and some nine to 10 million 
people.4 However, what shocked America and its allies was not the group’s rapid military 
victories, as much as the proficiency with which IS spread its violent apocalyptic ideology. 
Leveraging social media and networked distribution, IS challenged the cherished tenets of 
liberal democracy and offered followers what many believed was a barbaric, medieval 
alternative where public executions, slavery, and the sexual subjugation of women and 
 
3 Discussions about narratives and counter-narratives as a matter of government policy first appear in 
2005 with the UK CONTEST strategy. This idea took root fully in the United States with the previously 
referenced 2011 White House strategy but the fervor of concern was greatly heightened by IS beginning in 
2014.  
4 As of November 2017, the group has lost almost all of its territory due to aggressive kinetic 
campaigns by the Iraq Army, Kurdish militias, and U.S. forces. Henry Johnson, “Mapped: The Islamic 
State Is Losing Its Territory—and Fast,” Foreign Policy, March 16, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/
03/16/mapped-the-islamic-state-is-losing-its-territory-and-fast/; Luis Martinez, “ISIS Has Lost 25 Percent 
of Territory It Once Held in Iraq, US Says,” March 13, 2015, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/isis-lost-25-
percent-territory-held-iraq-us/story?id=29625568. 
3 
children were normal. It seemed impossible that in 2015, such ideas would be the stated 
goals of a group trying to form a legitimate nation; and yet, IS was recruiting by the tens 
of thousands.  
At the time, it was a commonly accepted anecdote throughout senior leadership in 
the U.S. government that IS was “beating” the United States and other western 
governments on the communications front. In 2014, when IS began using social media to 
distribute its extremist messages and graphic videos, there was an immediate call for the 
United States to respond. The purported sophistication of IS’ content combined with its 
decentralized distribution networks stunned government officials; and, rather quickly, 
assessments of U.S. counter efforts found them wanting. In testimony before the U.S. 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Alberto M. Fernandez, then 
Coordinator of the State Department’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism 
Communications (CSCC),5 said in reference to IS, “The sense of being heavily outgunned 
and outnumbered was palpable, both in terms of our own resources and in what everyone 
else was doing against this adversary worldwide.”6 A 2016 report from the House 
Homeland Security Committee reflects similar thoughts, “Indeed, recent administrations 
have failed to develop a basic domestic ‘counter-messaging’ effort to blunt the propaganda 
of extremist groups.”7 Yet, despite all the hand wringing, none of the official reports or 
testimony offered any clarity about what the United States was specifically failing to do or 
achieve.  
The logical place to start when considering failure is to understand what was 
supposed to be accomplished in the first place, but unfortunately, the U.S. government 
never truly defined what the counter-messaging mission should accomplish, and perhaps, 
 
5 CSCC was the lead for all significant efforts in counter-narrative at the time, which made Fernandez 
the most senior U.S. official on the matter.  
6 Honorable Alberto Fernandez, Hearing before the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, ISIS Online: Countering Terrorist Radicalization & 
Recruitment on the Internet & Social Media, Senate, 114th Cong., 2nd sess., July 6, 2016, 
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/isis-online-countering-terrorist-
radicalization-and-recruitment-on-the-internet_social-media. 
7 House Homeland Security Committee, A National Strategy to Win the War against Islamic Terror 
(Washington, DC: Congress, 2016), 15. 
4 
this is why no one could articulate the nature of the “failure.” The White House CVE 
strategy published in 2011 was not, despite the name, a truly strategic document. It 
provided a vision for engagement but not much in the way of substantive guidance to the 
involved agencies. It was also not updated to reflect the change of landscape when IS 
emerged. The federal agencies working on counter-narrative projects under the White 
House plan did not have individual strategic plans, assessment plans, or inter-agency 
coordination plans. None of the programs collected data about their efforts and no analysis 
of performance appears to have been formally conducted until the 2017 GAO review 
referenced earlier. In short, the answer to this question of was and still is the United States 
really failing is unknowable.  
A natural curiosity then is why does the U.S. believe it is failing? Cursory review 
of official sources suggests a few notable assumptions are at work under the surface. First, 
an ip so facto assumption seems to be present: the United States is failing because IS is 
succeeding. This assumption leads immediately to the second: IS is succeeding, which in 
and of itself assumes that the U.S. knows what its objectives are and can draw conclusions 
about overall performance. Also striking, is the persistence of statements regarding how 
uniquely good IS is at communications. Generally, this belief manifests as a sense that IS 
is doing something disruptive and fundamentally different by leveraging social networks 
and digital technology in a way that was unforeseeable, almost as if it were magic. Each of 
these ideas can be deconstructed enough to demonstrate the need for a full critical 
examination. Take for example the idea that IS messages are successfully achieving their 
goals, which for the sake of argument, is to recruit U.S. persons to the new caliphate. Is 
there evidence to suggest that they are doing so with great success? No, there really is not. 
While they may have recruited tens of thousands globally, the number of U.S. persons who 
traveled or attempted to travel is quite modest. In 2015, at the peak of such attempts, the 
FBI estimates about 250 made it to the battlefield in Syria; a handful were arrested while 
trying.8  
 
8 Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, Seamus Hughes, and Bennett Clifford, The Travelers: American 




Taken a step further, suppose it could be confirmed that all of these 250 U.S. 
persons received and consumed IS messages online prior to traveling, is it possible to know 
the degree to which the messages themselves were responsible for radicalization or 
mobilization to travel? Again, the answer is no. It is tempting to assume that the presence 
of IS content (i.e., Tweets, videos, chats) has some causal relationship to the outcome of 
“traveling to Syria” but that is unknowable. In fact, to the contrary, the very limited efficacy 
data that does exist suggests that while messages consumed through social media were 
perhaps part of the constellation of recruitment and radicalization, in most cases, more 
traditional person-to-person interactions were the critical factor in mobilization to travel.9 
Field research to validate this more broadly cannot be realistically conducted. Given the 
percentage of those who traveled and are deceased or missing, the sample would be too 
small to make useful generalizations. Finally, it is important to note that all the available 
data about media consumption and habits comes from law enforcement. In other words, it 
excludes any persons who viewed the message and did not radicalize or mobilize to travel, 
which is a significant bias.10  
This example demonstrates one of the fundamental gaps in data and misalignment 
of facts to ideas about counter-messaging that suggests the need to explore the whole 
concept of a counter-narrative in full. Surely, no one set out to be illogical or misinformed; 
lacking strong direction and under severe time pressure, the efforts undertaken by the 
agencies charged with building the current U.S. counter-messaging programs were perhaps 
well-meaning but have proven ill-fated. With millions of dollars invested in CVE and 
counter-messaging, it is worth determining the strength of the ideological and strategic 
foundation the current programs are resting on before further resources are expended. 
 
9 Erroll Southers and Justin Hienz, Foreign Fighters: Terrorist Recruitment and Countering Violent 
Extremism (CVE) Programs in Minneapolis-St. Paul (Los Angeles: National Center of Excellence for Risk 
and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE), University of Southern California, 2015), 20; 
Sean C. Reynolds and Mohammed M. Hafez, “Social Network Analysis of German Foreign Fighters in 
Syria and Iraq,” Terrorism and Political Violence, February 2017, 1–26.  
10 Christmann, “Preventing Religious Radicalisation,” 8. Although this literature review is somewhat 
dated, the author would argue that little has changed concerning the quality or availability of data. 
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B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Is counter-messaging a viable tool for countering domestic Islamist extremism? If 
so, to what end, for what objective(s)? If not, why not? 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The purpose of this study is to determine if counter-messaging is a practical tool 
for countering domestic Islamist extremism. The research follows a phased approach. It 
begins with an investigation into the current state of U.S. counter-messaging programs 
against radical Islamism, represented by IS, and includes a review of speeches, testimony, 
official documents, reports, and websites to determine what efforts are underway and what 
is known about their utility. From this baseline, it constructs a set of five “most-likely” 
objectives that reflects what the author believes to be the intended actions and desired 
outcomes of a domestic counter-messaging program or campaign.  
In the next phase, this set of objectives is critically examined and deconstructed 
using root cause analysis to identify underlying assumptions, ideas, and beliefs to expose 
the ideological framework the current efforts are set upon. Next, the author examines 
literature across five fields with direct relevance to the framework: political 
communications, strategic communications, political science, sociology, and terrorism 
studies. The likely efficacy of each of the five objectives is determined by consulting the 
literature to answer two questions. is this an achievable or appropriate goal for law 
enforcement and homeland security, and if so, is counter-messaging the most fitting tool 
to achieve this goal? 
Beyond determining the usefulness of a counter-narrative, it is also relevant to 
discuss how a counter-narrative should be shaped. To that end, the current narrative and 
alternative narrative from IS and the United States are presented and discussed. Since 
messages are a component of narratives, and therefore, counter-messages are a component 
of counter-narratives, understanding the broader context of the message exchange between 
IS and the U.S. is important to any informed opinion on the potential success or failure of 
counter-messaging.  
7 
The scope for this thesis is domestic. It only addresses counter-messaging aimed at 
influencing U.S. persons (residents and inhabitants) as opposed to externally facing efforts 
directed at non-U.S. persons abroad. There is a risk of external validity in trying to extend 
the findings outside the domestic audience; the rules of engagement for the U.S. 
government are different when considering non-U.S. persons and the frame and identity of 
external audiences is very different.  
D. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Subsequent chapters take the reader on a progressive journey that explores current 
efforts and potential efficacy. Chapter II reviews important definitions that set boundaries 
and establish what counter-messaging is and is not. Chapter III discusses IS and U.S. 
narratives including how they are crafted and how they interact with one another. Chapter 
IV assesses the objectives of counter-messaging against the literature, and provides an 
evidence grade for the appropriateness and achievability of each objective. Chapter V 
concludes the report with a review of key findings and recommendations. Appendix A 
presents a review of current U.S. CVE and counter-messaging programs. Appendix B 
contains the complete methodology. Appendix C lists the full set of documents reviewed 
on current U.S. programs, policy, and narrative.  
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II. DEFINITIONS: WHAT IS A NARRATIVE AND THE 
LANDSCAPE OF INFORMATION MISSIONS 
Different components of information missions are frequently conflated and 
confused for one another. Part of the confusion stems from the fact that two operational 
spaces exist within information missions, military and civilian. They necessarily overlap 
but the tools and rules of engagement differ greatly between the two environments. Terms 
frequently used to discuss information missions are outlined in Table 1 along with their 
primary application and the source of the definition. 
Table 1. Definitions. 
Term Definition Application Source 
Counter-
messaging 
Messaging is the act of communicating 
something; counter-messaging is the act of 
discrediting an adversary’s narrative to 






Narratives are the device a group uses to 
tell its current and prospective members 
how to act by articulating what it means to 
be part of the group, establishing what the 
group stands for, and presenting how the 
group believes it is positioned in the world; 
a counter-narrative is a specifically crafted 






“By “strategic communication(s)” we refer 
to: (a) the synchronization of words and 
deeds and how they will be perceived by 
selected audiences, as well as (b) programs 
and activities deliberately aimed at 
communicating and engaging with 
intended audiences, including those 
implemented by public affairs, public 
diplomacy, and information operations 
professionals.” 
Civilian White House13 
 
11 “Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs,” U.S. State Department, accessed July 7, 
2017, https://www.state.gov/r/. 
12 Tom Quiggin, “Understanding al-Queda’s Ideology for Counter-Narrative Work,” Perspectives on 
Terrorism 3, no. 2 (2009). 
13 Joseph R. Biden, National Framework for Strategic Communications (Washington, DC: White 
House, 2009), 2, https://fas.org/man/eprint/pubdip.pdf.  
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Term Definition Application Source 
Public Relations 
(Public Affairs) 
“Public relations is a strategic 
communication process that builds 
mutually beneficial relationships between 








“To support the achievement of US foreign 
policy goals and objectives, advance 
national interests, and enhance national 
security…” 




“planned operations to convey selected 
information and indicators to foreign 
audiences to influence their emotions, 
motives, objective reasoning, and 
ultimately the behavior of foreign 
governments, organizations, groups, and 
individuals. The purpose of psychological 
operations is to induce or reinforce foreign 
attitudes and behaviors favorable to the 
originator’s objectives.” 




“planned use of propaganda and other 
psychological operations to influence the 
opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior 







“The ultimate objective of U.S. MISO is to 
convince enemy, neutral, and friendly 
nations and forces to take action favorable 







“Propaganda, in the most neutral sense, 
means to disseminate or promote particular 
ideas… the term is associated with control 
and is regarded as a deliberate attempt to 
alter or maintain a balance of power that is 





14 “About Public Relations,” Public Relations Society of America, accessed July 7, 2017, 
http://apps.prsa.org/ 
AboutPRSA/Publicrelationsdefined/.  
15 U.S. State Department, “Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy.” 
16 James Farwell and John J. Hamre, Persuasion and Power: The Art of Strategic Communications 
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 3–4. 
17 “Psychological Warfare,” RAND, accessed July 7, 2017, https://www.rand.org/topics/psychological-
warfare.html.  
18 Public Affairs Office, Military Information Support Operations Command (Airborne) (Provisional) 
Fact Sheet (Ft. Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, n.d.), 1, accessed July 7. 2017, 
https://www.soc.mil/MISOC/MISO%20fact%20sheet.pdf.  
19 Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, 5th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage: 2012), 2–3.  
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Term Definition Application Source 
purpose of propaganda is to convey an 




“comprehensive civilian and military 
efforts made to defeat an insurgency and to 







In the context of this thesis, the two most important terms to understand are 
narrative (counter-narrative) and messaging (counter-messaging). An individual or group’s 
identity is reflected by its narrative. Simply put, a narrative is a group or individual’s own 
story about how they came to be who they are. Narratives are the device a group uses to 
tell its current and prospective members how to act by articulating what it means to be part 
of the group, establishing what the group stands for, and presenting how the group believes 
it is positioned in the world.21 Narratives are somewhat like advertising; just like different 
consumers find different commercials appealing, different individuals will find different 
groups’ narratives appealing and subsequently choose to join one group instead of 
another.22 An individual is likely to find a narrative appealing when (a) the story makes 
clear how the group aligns with or contributes to how the person thinks of themselves (their 
individual identity) and (b) the story explains how group membership will add value to the 
individual’s life.23 
Where the narrative is the story, messaging is the action of telling the story; and so 
counter-messaging is the act of responding to the adversary’s story with articulated 
counterpoints. Counter-messaging targets a very specific audience with a message 
 
20 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Doctrine for Counter-insurgency (COIN) (AJP-
3.4.4(A)) (Brussels: NATO Standardization Office, 2017), 1–1, https://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/allied-joint-doctrine-for-counter-insurgency-coin-ajp-344a. 
21 Quiggin, “Understanding al-Queda’s Ideology for Counter-Narrative Work.” 
22 Cristina Archetti, “Terrorism Communication and New Media: Explaining Radicalization in the 
Digital Age,” Perspectives on Terrorism 1, no. 9 (February 2015): 49–59, 
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/401/html. 
23 Henri Tajfel, Social Identity and Intergroup Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1982), 16–79. 
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designed to get the persons receiving the message to think differently about a particular 
issue. It does not necessarily ask them to do anything with that thought—i.e., report 
something to authorities—it seeks simply to change their thinking. Since counter-
messaging is usually targeting a specific point in an adversary’s message, it is inherently 
tactical. This distinction is significant when considering what counter-messaging can and 
cannot accomplish.  
The remainder of the definitions are provided to highlight the boundaries of 
counter-messaging and counter-narratives. Often, activities described to be part of a 
“counter-narrative” or “counter-messaging” campaign are in fact a different type of 
information mission with a different purpose. In fact, this thesis identifies that two of the 
five current objectives for the United States in counter-messaging fall into this category, 
and therefore, are out of bounds. While it may seem trivial, making the clear distinction 
between these different efforts and using the appropriate terms to describe them is more 
than academic rigor. Successful counter-messaging relies on precise and targeted 
objectives tailored to specific, segmented audiences; imprecision leads to ineffectiveness.24  
 
24 Andrew Glazzard, Losing the Plot: Narrative, Counter-Narrative and Violent Extremism (The 
Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2017), 3–7, https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/
ICCT-Glazzard-Losing-the-Plot-May-2017.pdf. 
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III. A TALE OF TWO NARRATIVES: STORIES OF US AND IS 
Its funny. All you have to do is say something nobody understands and 
they’ll do practically anything you want them to.  
—The Catcher in the Rye 
 
Like all good stories, this one begins with once upon a time and it should sound 
familiar: once upon a time, a small band of men believed they ought to have their own 
country and so they took land from their neighbors with brute force. In retaliation, a 
powerful alliance of countries came to the aid of their neighbors and thus began the war to 
restore the land to its rightful leaders. Such a common tale could feature any cast of 
characters from nearly any time in history. Uninspiring and inconsequential, to motivate 
action, this narrative needs to rarify itself; it needs a better frame. That is exactly what IS 
did; they reframed an unoriginal story into a narrative compelling enough to capture 
international attention, and in so doing, drew the United States and its allies into a “battle 
of ideas.”25  
In this section, the frames comprising the IS and the U.S. narratives are presented 
and discussed. This serves as a character study of sorts, introducing the two main characters 
in the story and offering insights into how they view themselves and how they view each 
other. This understanding is necessary to the critical examination of how these stories are 
presented through messages and counter-messages, which unfolds in subsequent chapters. 
This chapter also gives context to future discussions about the goals of counter-messaging 
and their achievability.  
Before presenting the narratives though, a word on how they are constructed and 
the importance of frames. Narratives, the stories themselves, are composed of frames and 
 
25 The author uses this term with some hesitation. Although it is fairly commonplace, in her opinion it 
gives undo credence to the idea that there is a conflict of ideas between the West and Islam. The author 
does not believe such a conflict exists or should exist. Furthermore, using language like “battle for hearts 
and minds” just further amplifies the perception of conflict. However, it is useful here to make this very 
point. Farwell and Hamre, Persuasion and Power, 143; Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: 
Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat (New York: Random House, 2007), 217. 
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constructed using framing techniques. In the simplest terms, a frame is an outline for 
interpreting experiences and the surrounding world.26 Like a filter on a camera, frames 
shape the way a person or group sees the world; altering the filter of the story changes its 
appeal to audiences. Returning to the earlier discussion about narratives, and the role of 
narratives in groups, according to Goffman, “Taken altogether the primary frameworks of 
a particular social group constitute a central element of its culture.”27 From the perspective 
of a group with political objectives, like IS, framing can also be understood as the “process 
by which political actors define the issue for their audience.”28 Frames (filters) interpret 
the current reality for the party’s followers and define how followers should respond to this 
reality; in other words, frames tell the party’s members what the current issues mean to 
them and how they should think about these issues.29 Groups have core frames, or those 
frames that are central to and serve as a foundation for group identity, and supporting 
frames, which serve to bolster the core frames, and as the name implies, support the 
refinement of a group identity.  
Framing techniques are the method by which a frame is applied. For example, 
storytelling is a common framing technique where the message takes on an air of drama 
through epic, mythological, or exaggerated circumstances. Framing techniques are the 
physical way in which the frames are put together into a narrative. They enhance frames 
by adding to or amplifying the existing tone, style, or emotional connotation of the 
message.  
 
26 Erving Goffman and Bennett M. Berger, Frame Analysis. An Essay on the Organization of 
Experience (Boston: Northern University Press, 1986), 27; Dennis Chong and James N. Druckman, 
“Framing Theory,” Annual Review of Political Science 10 (2007): 104–106, DOI: 10.1146/
annurev.polisci.10.072805.103054.  
27 Goffman and Berger, Frame Analysis.  
28 Regula Hanggli and Hanspeter Kriesi, “Frame Construction and Frame Promotion (Strategic 
Framing Choices),” American Behavioral Scientist 56, no. 3 (2012): 260–278, DOI: 10.1177/
0002764211426325. 
29 Chong and Druckman, “Framing Theory,” 260–278.  
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Think of the narrative as a house where the frames are the studs and the framing 
techniques are the hardware used to secure them.30 Once it is completely built, the set of 
frames collectively becomes the house or the narrative. A detailed understanding of how 
the house is built, or how the story is assembled, is essential to finding exploitable 
weakness in it. It is also essential to seeing malalignment and recognizing the limitations 
of such efforts.31  
A. THE IS NARRATIVE IN THE WEST 
Research into the IS narrative presented in this thesis was conducted as part of a 
separate study into frames and framing techniques using IS open source English-language 
recruitment materials in 2016. The author reviewed video and social media content from 
Instagram and Twitter and applied the framework approach to identify the core frames and 
framing techniques in the sample.32 The full methodology for this research is presented in 
the methodology section. It is worth noting that there are many such studies of IS 
messaging which have reached similar conclusions and others that have not; interested 
readers are encouraged to review the breadth of the literature on this topic and form their 
own opinions.  
In 2014, IS revealed itself to the world with a call for all pious Muslims to come to 
its self-proclaimed caliphate.33 Days later, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi stood on a balcony at the 
 
30 The author is demonstrating a framing technique in presenting framing, using an analogy or “like 
this.” In this case, the goal is to make an intangible idea real by anchoring it to something already known to 
the reader. This is a common technique in IS materials; their goal is to anchor new ideas to existing ones 
that people have about themselves.  
31 Glazzard, Losing the Plot, 7–16. 
32 The framework approach is a method for progressive analysis that builds the analytic framework 
through successive refinement. A benefit of this approach is its organic nature; rather than starting with a 
pre-determined set of things to find in the data, it allows for simply looking to see what is present in the 
data and then determining what it may mean.  




al-Nuri mosque in Mosul and called “true believers” with a story that would remain the 
dominant narrative until the loss of the physical caliphate in 2017:34  
There is a State (the Islamic State) founded in ancient piety, providing a 
globally oppressed people the opportunity for a better life alongside others 
who share their complete commitment to Islam. Before it is even fully built, 
the survival of this State is at great risk from an enemy determined for 
centuries to not only prevent the success of our people but to humiliate and 
subjugate us and ultimately eliminate our faith from the planet. If you come 
to this State, you will join a movement to secure the future of your faith. 
You will become a champion defender of Islam and receive in return 
prosperity for yourself and your future family, guaranteed by a just and 
effective government that is grounded in the tradition and teaching of your 
beloved faith.35  
Compare this narrative to the one presented at the opening of this chapter. Although 
they tell the same story—a fight for land and the right to exist independently—this version 
is far more inspiring and compelling. The following segments identity the frames and 
techniques that account for the difference.  
1. Message Craft 
When deconstructed, IS materials have three overarching core frames: contest for 
survival, effective state, and just or pious state.36 In framing the story to all audiences, IS 
chooses to heavily emphasize its contest with the West. Many of its propaganda videos and 
 
34 Baghdadi proclaimed himself Caliph Ibrahim, the “leader of all Muslims everywhere.” Hannah 
Strange, “Islamic State Leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Addresses Muslims in Mosul,” July 5, 2014, 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10948480/Islamic-State-leader-Abu-Bakr-al-
Baghdadi-addresses-Muslims-in-Mosul.html. In 2017, the narrative shifted in its core messages to 
eliminate focus on the physical state and its governance (presumably for obvious reasons). The new 
messages shifted to serving the faith wherever and however a believer could. The new messages were not 
part of the data collected or reviewed in this thesis but the reader may find the following pre- and post-
comparison informative: Haroro J. Ingram and Alastair Reed, “Reverse-Engineering the ISIS Playbook, 
Part I and II: CT-CVE Messaging Lessons from ISIS’s English-Language Magazines,” VoxPol, April 13, 
2018, https://www.voxpol.eu/reverse-engineering-the-isis-playbook-part-i-ct-cve-messaging-lessons-from-
isiss-english-language-magazines/. 
35 Other researchers have come to similar conclusions. See Alastair Reed and Jennifer Dowling, “The 
Role of Historical Narratives in Extremist Propaganda,” Defense Strategic Communications 4 (Spring 
2018): 80–83; Daniel Milton, Pulling Back the Curtain: An Inside Look at the Islamic State’s Media 
Organization (West Point: Combating Terrorism Center, 2018), 6–7, https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/
2018/08/Pulling-Back-the-Curtain.pdf. 
36 The full methodology for this work is outlined in Appendix B. Also, for other researchers with 
similar findings, see references in footnote 35.  
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print materials physically show conflict—i.e., battles—or reference its struggle for survival 
against an enemy that is portrayed as determined to eliminate not only IS itself but all of 
Islam. Second to contest, IS focuses on the construct of its state. Much of its English 
language content visually displays and references explicitly the functionality and fairness 
of IS as a government or state. There are images of children in schools, roads, markets full 
of goods, housing, etc.; all of which are the hallmarks of a thriving society. Tied to the 
concept of statehood is the presentation of piety, the third frame, as the foundation for 
justice. “Just” for IS means “piously just”; the caliphate follows Sharia, and so faith and 
state are deeply intertwined.  
In crafting their story, IS uses several framing techniques: tradition, storytelling, 
and artifacts (symbols or symbolism). With this construction style, the contest for survival 
takes on a mythological nature and the pious, effective state is grounded in the richness of 
the ancient Islamic traditions and the glory of the Ottoman Empire. Symbols (artifacts) are 
frequently used to emphasize these points. Figure 1 presents an example from Instagram 
that shows a solider on a battlefield carrying the IS flag. Note that the figure is dressed in 
ancient clothes evoking the glory of the past and presented in a desert landscape, a common 
motif that according to scholars from the West Point Combating Terrorism Center, implies 
a shared regional identity. Also, distant mountains represent the divine and martyrdom.37 
37 Combating Terrorism Center, Islamic Imagery Project: Visual Motifs in Jihadi Internet Propaganda 
(WestPoint, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2006), 25–26. 
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Figure 1. Example of IS Use of Symbols, Instagram.38 
Returning to the narrative as a whole, consider the influence of choosing these types 
of message frames. First, anchoring to the past calls up language and imagery associated 
with the Crusades and western imperialism. This technique ties modern day political 
grievances to ancient ones, linking the present generation to its ancestors in an unbroken 
chain of wrongs.39 For societies with strong patronage lines (tribal and family alliances), 
this technique is particularly effective at binding the current generation to this never-ending 
conflict as a matter of honor. The second thing this narrative does effectively is enshrine 
conflict as the only method of achieving the group’s desired result. Since conflict is central 
to group identity through group narrative, less consequential or dramatic options are 
essentially removed from the table. Put alternatively, as a political entity with the stated 
objective of achieving statehood, IS is telling its followers that this goal cannot be achieved 
without war or violence. This concept is relevant to future discussions about efficacy with 
regards to counter-messages.  
38 Source: “Daesh,” Instagram, https://www.instagram.com/p/BJJJJsLhHWe/?tagged=daesh, accessed 
August 20, 2016. Page is no longer available. 
39 Reed and Dowling, “The Role of Historical Narratives,” 80. 
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2. Understanding the Audience  
Much has been made of the professionalism and expertise demonstrated by IS with 
regard to messaging; indeed, its media organization is highly centralized and robustly 
structured and provides strict guidance on message construct and release.40 While this 
structure in and of itself is impressive, what IS does that truly distinguishes it from other 
similar organizations is manage messaging across multiple audience segments.41 Much like 
a professional PR firm, IS cultivates, crafts, and delivers messages differently for different 
target audiences; they are expert at delivering the resonant narrative to the right audience. 
To do so, they must have a thorough understanding of two things, first, who specifically 
the target audience is, and second, what platforms the target audience is using to receive 
and send information. 
On the first point of audience, primary source documents seized during raids 
provide some insights into who this group is but as validation is impossible, it is perhaps 
more useful to reframe the question as who responded to the materials IS put out in the 
United States, regardless of whether or not they were truly the intended audience. From 
what is known about those who traveled or attempted to travel from the U.S. (and also 
other Western countries), they were predominantly young men averaging 25 years old.42 
Beyond that similarity, multiple comprehensive studies conclude that the travelers had very 
little in common. They had widely diverse backgrounds representing a variety of 
socioeconomic, educational, and employment trajectories. Counter to the common 
stereotypes, they were not generally poor, maladjusted, lacking in opportunities, or 
otherwise disenfranchised.43 What they appeared to share most was a need for greater 
 
40 Milton, Pulling Back the Curtain, 6–7. 
41 Robert Boyle and Kevin Kallmyer, “Combatting the Islamic State’s Digital Dominance: Revitalizing 
U.S. Communication Strategy,” The Washington Quarterly 39, no. 1 (January 2, 2016): 30–31, DOI: 
10.1080/0163660x. 
2016.1170478; Milton, Pulling Back the Curtain, 8–10. 
42 Meleagrou-Hitchens, Hughes, and Clifford, The Travelers, 16; Brian Michael Jenkins, The Origins 
of America’s Jihadists (Santa Monica: RAND, 2017), 20, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/
PE251.html; Christmann, “Preventing Religious Radicalisation,” 23. 
43 Although it continues to be disproved, a fair amount of “authoritative” sources claim that IS recruits 
a higher than usual number of socio-/psychopaths, persons with mental illness, or “lost” youth, among 
other things. This is simply not true.  
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purpose in life, accompanied by a desire to deepen their faith.44 If young Muslim males 
seeking a greater purpose are the target audience, or at least the responsive one, then the 
core frames in the IS narrative offer several key points of intersection with their new 
emerging identities: epic battles, heroic leadership, righteous and divine purpose, a future 
of godliness for themselves and a pathway to a family and children. Follow this narrative 
with “IS wants YOU,” and it is not hard to imagine how individuals have been swayed to 
the group.45  
As previously mentioned, IS tailors its message to the audience. Outside the United 
States, IS promotes somewhat different frames in narrative.46 There are campaigns 
targeting its residents (internal), other locals (non-residents), women, and European 
Muslims. Generally, the core frames remain present but the materials and delivery 
mechanism are slightly adjusted to the preferences of each audience segment. As this thesis 
is domestically focused, it does not explore these other narratives or compare them to 
western focused narratives, but it is important to recognize that the group has distinct 
narratives for various audience types.47 
On the second point of understanding how to reach its target audience, IS is widely 
credited as sophisticated in their use of social networking platforms. Indeed, the use of 
certain technology like TweetBots, albeit coupled with a decentralized content distribution 
strategy, shows savvy. However, rather than simply credit the technology platforms, the 
valuable point is that IS recognized where its audience was already talking and used those 
platforms to distribute their message. That is to say, the message consumers drove the 
distribution strategy, not the message creator. Young Muslims are already using Twitter, 
 
44 Southers and Hienz, Foreign Fighters, 17–18. 
45 The idea that a fluid or partially constructed self-identity is a risk factor for recruitment and 
radicalization is supported by case studies and literature; it is also a possible explanation for the uniquely 
young profile of IS recruits. See Southers and Hienz, Foreign Fighters, 12; Scott Helfstein, Edges of 
Radicalization: Individuals, Networks, and Ideas in Violent Extremism (West Point, NY: Combating 
Terrorism Center at West Point, 2012), 14. 
46 Ingram and Reed, “Reverse-Engineering the ISIS Playbook.”  
47 For more on gendered messaging, see Nelly Lahoud, “Empowerment or Subjugation: A Gendered 




YouTube, Telegram, and other social platforms and perhaps recognizing this, IS took its 
message where its desired audience was already engaged. The issue of IS and the internet 
is discussed further in Chapter IV, but the key point in this section is to recognize how 
delivery platforms are related to audience segmentation and overall message resonance. 
B. THE U.S. NARRATIVE 
Before examining the U.S. narrative, it is important to address two issues, first, 
author bias and second, terminology. As a U.S. citizen and resident since birth, it is 
impossible for the author to objectively analyze the U.S. narrative as it is her own. To limit 
bias as much as possible, this analysis includes only testimony and speeches of Presidents 
and Cabinet officials; no policy documents or other written materials are included.48 This 
point leads to the second issue, terminology. Since the content of the U.S. narrative comes 
from state leaders and is presented in speeches and formal remarks, it is by definition more 
appropriately thought of as public diplomacy or strategic communications. That is to say 
by definition, the United States does not have a counter-narrative to IS; hence this thesis. 
However, not having a counter-narrative is not the same thing as not having an alternative 
narrative. What this section explores is most appropriately thought of as the U.S.’ 
alternative narrative to IS, or radical Islamism in general, as the roots of the current 
alternative narrative pre-date IS.  
Beginning with President Bush following 9/11, the U.S. narrative in relation to 
Islamist extremism has remained fairly constant. It goes something like this: The United 
States is the world’s premiere champion of civil and human rights, justice, and peace. Since 
the founding of our great democracy, we have supported and encouraged oppressed people 
everywhere to pursue freedom. As the world’s preeminent democracy, we have a 
responsibility to carry the global torch of freedom. We do this by rejecting hate and 
extremism, ending dictatorships and freeing nations, and leading the international 
community in continuous efforts to protect individual human rights and human dignity. We 
have a duty to the liberal order and to preserve peace in the world, at all costs. This is the 
 
48 See the complete list of materials reviewed in Appendix C.  
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burden we bear for our greatness and a responsibility that is carried not only our leadership 
but by each of our citizens.  
The narrative first presented by Bush has remained consistent across presidents and 
administrations. Overall, it is fairly moralistic and esoteric. Very often, the generic U.S. 
narrative is accompanied by specific counter-points aimed at certain radical Islamist 
claims. These counter-points are presented and discussed in the following sections.  
1. Message Craft 
The U.S. narrative centers on two core frames, the United States is an international 
beacon of freedom and human rights, and U.S. leadership is critical to preserving 
international order. America positions itself as the world’s international peacekeeper and 
calls on its people to consider oppressed people (i.e., Iraqis, Syrians) as brothers in need of 
protection. 49 There is a heavy focus on the duty America has to encourage freedom and 
promote democracy. This duty encompasses the preservation of basic human rights 
including women’s rights, religious freedom, freedom of expression, and freedom to 
choose a government along with denouncing any and all violence or oppression. Examples 
of these frames are presented in Table 2.  
  
 
49 Some Presidents more than others use Christian or biblical values and language, such as a “brother’s 
keeper” when discussing the conflict with either al-Qaeda or IS. As a result, the issue is sometimes framed 
as a religious contest between Christianity and Islam. While U.S. identity surely has Christian based-
components, the issue is more complicated than such assessments belie, especially given the institutional 
separation of church and state and the diverse identities and religious beliefs of the American people.  
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Table 2. Examples of U.S. Core Frames. 
President 
Bush 
“At the same time, the oppressed people of Afghanistan will know the 
generosity of America and our allies. As we strike military targets, we’ll also 
drop food, medicine and supplies to the starving and suffering men and 
women and children of Afghanistan... The United States of America is a 
friend to the Afghan people.”50 
President 
Obama 
“And long after the current messengers of hate have faded from the world’s 
memory, alongside the brutal despots, and deranged madmen, and ruthless 
demagogues who litter history—the flag of the United States will still wave 
from small-town cemeteries to national monuments, to distant outposts 
abroad. And that flag will still stand for freedom.”51 
Secretary  
Clinton 
“You know why we have to do all of this? Because we are the indispensable 
nation. We are the force for progress, prosperity and peace….So because the 
United States is still the only country that has the reach and resolve to rally 
disparate nations and peoples together to solve problems on a global scale, 
we cannot shirk that responsibility. Our ability to convene and connect is 
unparalleled, and so is our ability to act alone whenever necessary.”52 
Secretary 
Kerry 
“We need to fulfill the responsibility that we all share to uphold the global 
norms, to defend freedom in all of its dimensions, and to respect the rights 
and the dignity of every single human being.”53 
 
2. Core Frames 
In support of these core frames, leaders frequently emphasize U.S. resilience, which 
is a subtle, reinforcing acknowledgement of the contest between the “West” and radical 
Islamists (think we will outlast you). This combination of frames can be seen in the 
selection from President Obama’s 9/11 memorial speech presented in Table 2, “and long 
 
50 George Bush, “Presidential Address to the Nation,” White House, October 7, 2001, 
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007-8.html.  
51 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at the National Defense University,” White House, May 
23, 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-
defense-. 
52 Hilary Clinton, “Remarks on American Leadership,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 31, 
2013, https:// 
www.cfr.org/event/remarks-american-leadership-0. 
53 John Kerry, “Remarks at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs,” U.S. Department of State, October 
26, 2016, https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/10/263653.htm. 
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after [the bad people are gone]…the flag of the US will still wave.” Other examples of the 
resilience frame are presented in Table 3.  
Table 3. Examples of the Resilience Frame. 
President Obama 
“Thirteen years after small and hateful minds conspired to break us, 
America stands tall and America stands proud. And guided by the values 
that sustain us, we will only grow stronger.”54 
President Trump 
“But America cannot be intimidated, and those who try will soon join the 
long list of vanquished enemies who dared to test our mettle…Woven 
into that beautiful flag is the story of our resolve.”55  
 
In constructing its narrative, the United States prefers to use spin, metaphor, and 
artifacts as its framing techniques. Certainly, the U.S. narrative incorporates frequent 
undertones of tradition, but it is often referenced via objects (artifacts), such as the 
Constitution, or people used as objects, like the Founding Fathers. Again, from President 
Bush’s speech to the nation on 9/11, “America was targeted for attack because we’re the 
brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light 
from shining.”56 This speech shows symbolism—the light of freedom, and includes a 
metaphor—America as the beacon, like the light. Under the symbolism is the spin of 
America as the light for everyone in the world; arguably, an exclusively positive view of 
the U.S. global position and actions.57  
 
54 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at 9/11 Memorial,” White House, September 11, 2014, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/11/remarks-president-911-memorial. 
55 Donald Trump, “Remarks by President Trump at the 9/11 Memorial Observance,” White House, 
September 11, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-9-11-
memorial-observance/.  
56 George Bush, “Statement by the President in his Address to the Nation,” September 11, 2001, 
https://george 
wbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html. 
57 Considering these frames, it is not difficult to see how other countries interpret them as being 
patronizing and imperialist, a common complaint raised against the United States. Where from the U.S. 
perspective, “champion of free people” is only positive, from an alternative position, it may be viewed as 
“our view of freedom is the only view of freedom; your idea of freedom isn’t really free.” 
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C. STORIES OF THE ENEMY: COUNTER-NARRATIVES 
Much muddying of the water occurs when comparing an established nation state 
with hundreds of years of history behind its narrative to an emerging state with no history 
to it and no access to the traditional channels of diplomacy and communications that an 
established state enjoys. As discussed earlier, the United States does not have a true 
counter-narrative to IS; rather, it has an alternative narrative delivered along with specific 
counter-messages. Regardless of the inequities, it is still worth understanding the 
interaction between the messaging of IS and the U.S., particularly in the context of 
determining if there is a need to develop a specific domestic counter-narrative.  
When describing the exchange of stories as narratives and counter-narratives, there 
is an inherently adversarial frame; yet, in reality, the stories interact much more with each 
other than suggested. They are more like dance partners than fencing partners. The stories 
do not exist in total separateness, coming together in pointed exchanges- touché. They are 
at their very essence both continuously re-created through their repeated engagement with 
each other. Trying to separate the two stories completely into “theirs and ours” makes 
academic analysis possible but also carries an artificiality in that it sanitizes what is a messy 
and complex process. With that in mind, this section brings the narratives together to satisfy 
the natural curiosity of how they align and explores the broad counter-messaging that has 
taken place in a predominantly diplomatic context.  
1. U.S. Counter-Messaging to IS 
The U.S. efforts to discredit IS and its narrative coalesce around four key points: 
brutal violence, illegitimacy as a government, military loss, and perversion of Islam. This 
choice of counter-message points in part reflects the United States’ own narrative; they 
align with U.S. ideas about what kind of values it has, i.e., justice, human dignity, freedom. 
Summed up, U.S. counter-messages sound like this: IS is a horrifically violent but tawdry 
adversary who twisted Islam to justify its bloodlust and greed. As a representative example, 
in a speech to the nation after the attack in San Bernardino, CA, President Obama stated: 
ISIL does not speak for Islam. They are thugs and killers, part of a cult of 
death, and they account for a tiny fraction of more than a billion Muslims 
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around the world—including millions of patriotic Muslim Americans who 
reject their hateful ideology. Moreover, the vast majority of terrorist victims 
around the world are Muslim. If we’re to succeed in defeating terrorism we 
must enlist Muslim communities as some of our strongest allies, rather than 
push them away through suspicion and hate.58 
In this same speech, statements that reflect the core frames and the resilience frame 
discussed earlier are also present. It is fairly common for the frames to be used alongside 
the counter-messages, which makes them appear as if they are in fact frames themselves; 
however, counter-messages are notably more direct and specific. Where the narrative says, 
“we are the champion of democracy,” the counter-message says “the holiness they claim 
is unfounded, they have perverted Islam.” This point is key: narratives are more universal 
and strategic; messages are more tangible and tactical. 
From a technique perspective, the U.S. approach to counter-messaging is best 
described as measured and point-for-point, or similar to a debate. For each frame that IS 
presents, the United States responds in the tone of the facts do not support your position. 
Through testimonials of disenfranchised fighters, photos, and statistics (when available), 
U.S. counter-messaging centers on evidence. In fact, when describing the CSCC’s strategy 
under President Obama, former director Rashad Hussain said, “When amplified properly, 
we believe the facts speak for themselves.”59 Table 4 shows how the IS frames and the 
U.S. counter-messages align. 
  
 
58 Barack Obama, “Address to the Nation on the San Bernardino Terrorist Attack and the War on 
ISIS,” CNN, December 6, 2015, https://www.cnn.com/2015/12/06/politics/transcript-obama-san-
bernardino-isis-address/index.html.  
59 Greg Miller and Scott Higham, “In a Propaganda War against ISIS, the U.S. Tried to Play by the 




Table 4. Point-to-Point Comparison of the IS Narrative and U.S. Counter-
messages. 
IS Frame IS Message U.S. Counter Point U.S. Message 
Contest to 
Survive 
- Existential fight for 
survival against the 
West 




- Barbaric; gruesome 
executions 
- Enslave women and 
young girls 
- Losing territory, 
leaders and fighters 
- Low recruitment 
Piety/Pious 
(Just) State 
- Practicing the true form 
of Islam  
- State founded in piety; 
divine right to 
statehood  




- Not true Islam 
(Islam is a religion 
of peace) 
- Ideas rejected by a 
majority of Muslims 
- Kill mostly Muslims 
Effective (Just) 
State 
- Functioning state; 
schools, roads, 
businesses, etc.  
- Sharia and Islamic 
justice 
- Opportunity for 
children (a better life) 
Illegitimacy 
- Not recognized 
government 
- Can’t govern 
effectively; can’t 
pay workers 
- Losing territory  
 
2. Analysis 
On the face, this presentation of facts point-for-point seems reasonable. If IS says 
it has a legitimate government with functional roads and schools, is that true? No, well 
proving that discredits them so let us show the world what life is really like in the 
“caliphate.” It is a logical, organized approach. It also reflects several of the critical flaws 
that are prevalent throughout U.S. thinking about counter-messaging.  
Returning to the idea of who responds to IS messages—young men with a desire to 
be part of something bigger than themselves, perhaps seeking to further their commitment 
to their faith—how motivating or compelling might “facts” be to this group? If the goal of 
a counter-message is to deter them from identifying with the IS narrative, “facts” are 
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probably not emotionally appealing contributions to their emerging identities.60 
Furthermore, in some cultures, directness and facts are not preferred styles of 
communication. It can be off-putting and seem aggressive in areas where storytelling, the 
use of parables, and polite deference are more common.61  
Looking more deeply at this idea of “facts,” what the United States claims to be 
“fact” is often more subjective than the word “fact” conveys. For example, how does 
someone compellingly argue what factually constitutes a better future for someone’s 
children or what factually constitutes a prosperous life? Clearly, there are cultural 
differences in how any one person defines a “better future” or a “prosperous life.” When 
the U.S. argues that “the facts” do not support that IS provides this type of life, it is doing 
so from a U.S.-centric perspective, which is a deeply arrogant position to take. It implies 
that the United States is the world’s foremost authority on what it means to have a good 
life, one that meets with its approval. This is precisely the charge leveled against the United 
States in this region: arrogance, imperialism, and disregard for others.62 When the “facts” 
are disputable relative to the audience’s perspective, the counter-message has nothing to 
stand upon unless it is certain the target audience has the same worldview. In this case, the 
counter-message may end up doing more harm than good.  
This point leads directly to the issue of credibility and the perceived authenticity of 
the messenger. In considering the counter-messages presented, several examples standout 
in which the United States cannot possibly be a credible speaker. First, and most notably, 
is in regards to the idea that IS is “un-Islamic.” Although perhaps a well-meant attempt to 
be inclusive of mainstream Muslims, this language is particularly pernicious for two 
reasons, (1) viewed as a predominantly Christian nation (globally), the United States 
cannot possibly be an authority on the subject of what constitutes “genuine” Islamicness, 
and (2) it inadvertently reinforces the IS narrative that the United States is waging war with 
Islam. When presidents come forward and say, “these people are not true Muslims,” no 
 
60 What makes messages persuasive and appealing is further addressed in Chapter IV.  
61 Farwell and Hamre, Persuasion and Power, 164–165. 
62 Faiza Patel and Meghan Koushik, “Countering Violent Extremism,” Brennan Center for Justice, 
March 16, 2017, https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/countering-violent-extremism. 
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matter how it is intended, it can easily be presented by IS as evidence of a campaign against 
Islam. Who is to say that it will stop with just this group of Muslims; it could always be 
another and another until none remain.  
Even U.S. counter-points to IS’ famed use of violence have credibility issues. The 
IS narrative casts violence as justified for the sake of preserving the faith; and presumably 
to their “true believers,” any action is defensible for that cause. No amount of 
condemnation is useful as a counter-point. Furthermore, because IS uses violence as a 
symbol of victory, counter-points can be reframed as the mewing of the losing side. For 
example, of course the United States condemns our violence, because they see that we are 
powerful challengers. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, by design, the U.S. 
condemnation (of the violence) validates that a contest/competition/conflict is occurring in 
the first place. This is partly why it is so difficult to work against contest as a core frame. 
To IS followers, there is no alternative for the group to achieve its goal of statehood, and 
therefore, the need to fight (fiercely, with violence) is even more compelling.63 When the 
United States responds to the use of violence, as IS leaders know that it must, it gives them 
status as an adversary and suggests that IS is actually a threat to the United States, which 
fuels the narrative cycle and elevates IS’ status with its followers. 
These issues show how challenging it is for the U.S. government to present an IS 
counter-narrative in an official capacity. Neither IS or the US is viewed by the other or the 
world at large exactly as they present themselves. It is for this reason that throwing a 
counter-narrative out into space is ineffective. The receiver of the narrative has frames of 
their own and pre-existing beliefs about the United States and IS that influence the degree 
to which they accept and reject the groups’ ideas about themselves and each other. The risk 
may be greater than the reward.  
D. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Any discussion on the efficacy of a potential counter-narrative must begin with an 
understanding of the current landscape. IS and the U.S. have narratives that are interacting 
 
63 This ties into the prophetic nature of the group’s narrative; a good discussion of that issue can be 
found in Reed and Dowling, “The Role of Historical Narratives,” 97–100.  
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through various strategic communications and diplomatic outlets. Each architects its 
narrative differently and uses different tools. IS prefers to emphasize conflict using 
physical violence symbolically and weaving threads from the past into its narrative 
tapestry, connecting its current fighters to their ancient ancestors. The United States 
focuses on its role as the champion of freedom and human rights, spinning itself as the 
leader upon which the peace of the globe rests. In countering the IS narrative, the U.S. 
chooses to emphasize IS’ brutality, illegitimacy, military ineffectiveness and its warped 
version of Islam but it faces credibility problems on several of those points that call into 
question the value of such efforts.  
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IV. WINNER TAKE NOTHING 
No that is the great fallacy: the wisdom of old men. They do not grow wise. 
They grow careful. 
—A Farewell to Arms 
 
All public messaging campaigns begin with a goal around which a strategy takes 
shape. In the best cases, this strategy is accompanied by objectives to which tactics are 
aligned and measures assigned so the campaign can be monitored and adjusted to ensure it 
achieves its ultimate goal.64 Tactics are usually audience and strategy driven, requiring data 
and research about the target audience to determine both where and how they consume the 
types of information the campaign intends to deliver. This data forms the backbone for a 
set of profiles that the campaign uses to tailor its content (frames and framing techniques) 
and delivery mechanisms. Performance metrics are selected, assessment periods assigned, 
and then, the campaign begins.  
As discussed previously, the United States lacks for any such strategy, tactics, 
evaluation plan, or data. Yet, agencies are still working on counter-narrative programs and 
Congress has asked them to continue this work. Therefore, it is reasonably to conclude that 
some shared purpose or goal underlying their efforts must exist. To examine the potential 
or desired objectives of a counter-narrative campaign, a review of official sources was 
conducted and common themes recorded until a set of five overarching objectives emerged, 
as presented in Table 5.  
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Table 5. U.S. Counter-messaging Objectives. 
Objective Type of Objective 
1. End the recruitment of fighters. Tactical 
2. Stop radicalization. Strategic 
3. De-radicalize individuals. Tactical 
4. End sympathy for their cause. Strategic 
5. Engender sympathy for our cause. Strategic 
 
Overall, these five objectives appear consistently across the content reviewed and 
they are often presented as if they are all one or are interchangeable. This 
interconnectedness of ideas is important for two reasons. First, as subsequent analysis 
shows, they share underlying assumptions, so as one set of assumptions is disproved, it 
impacts multiple objectives. Second, as discussed earlier, imprecision (looseness) in 
defining goals often leads to an inability to effectively identify and reach the target 
audience, ultimately leading to failure.  
Of these five desired or stated objectives, two clearly fall into the mission space of 
public diplomacy, strategic communications, or propaganda, depending on how the 
definitions are applied. Returning to the definitional boundaries outlined in Chapter II, 
objectives four and five, to end sympathy for their cause and to engender sympathy for our 
own, belong in these other domains and are necessarily out of scope for a counter-
messaging effort.65 In the military mission space, these objectives would fall under MISO 
or PSYOPS. These efforts attempt to win “hearts and minds,” and presumably, the U.S. 
government does not embark on formal campaigns to win the “hearts and minds” of its 
own people. Consider the words of former CIA Director David Petraeus who, in discussing 
“hearts and minds,” offers, “the prize in current and future conflicts is increasingly the will, 
control, and loyalty of the populations rather than a tactical military victory of the death 
of terrorists or insurgents (emphasis mine).”66 Clearly, such a goal is firmly out of bounds 
 
65 While these objectives may be part of the outcome of a counter-messaging campaign, as an 
objective, to mean a stated goal, these are properly categorized in diplomacy, strategic communications, or 
propaganda, regardless of how people feel about that particular word.  
66 Farwell and Hamre, Persuasion and Power, 143. 
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for a democratic government, and as such, objectives four and five are dropped from further 
analysis.  
This chapter then explores the appropriateness and efficacy of the remaining three 
objectives by comparing them to the results of the literature review to answer the questions, 
is it an appropriate goal for law enforcement or homeland security, and if so, to what extent 
is it achievable?  
A. OBJECTIVE ONE: END RECRUITMENT OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS  
The threat posed by foreign fighters, including those recruited from the US, 
traveling to join [ISIL] and from homegrown violent extremists are 
extremely dynamic. 
—James Comey, FBI Director67 
 
Since IS fighters are imported to the battlefield, stopping the flow of those fighters 
is both a priority domestic security issue and a necessary military objective. According to 
estimates from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), some 250 people traveled from 
the United States to Syria, presumably to join IS.68 Once trained and battle-tested, domestic 
law enforcement agencies fear these fighters may return and continue to engage in violence 
in the homeland or encourage others to do so.69 The general assumption made is that a 
counter-message campaign can do something to stem the flow of travelers. To deconstruct 
how policy makers may have arrived at this conclusion, Figure 2 presents a diagram of the 
assumptions and beliefs underlying this goal.  
 
67 Comey, “Fifteen Years after 9/11.” 
68 Julian Hattem, “FBI: More Than 200 Americans Have Tried to Fight for ISIS,” The Hill, July 8, 
2015, http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/247256-more-than-200-americans-tried-to-fight-for-isis-
fbi-says; Meleagrou-Hitchens, Hughes, and Clifford, The Travelers, 5. 
69 Nicholas J. Rasmussen, Hearing before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Countering 
Violent Islamist Extremism: The Urgent Threat of Foreign Fighters and Homegrown Terror (Washington, 
DC: National Counterterrorism Committee, 2015), 1, https://www.dni.gov/files/NCTC/documents/
news_documents/Countering_Violent_Islamist_Extremism.pdf. For the United States, the greater threat is 
not necessarily in its own citizens returning as fighters; rather, it is the threat of Europeans from allied 
nations using their “clean” passport to gain access to the United States. 
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Figure 2. End Recruitment Problem/Assumption Diagram. 
If the goal for objective one is to end the recruitment of fighters, to follow the 
problem map, ask why does this matter? Branch 1 identifies that fewer fighters lead to a 
smaller army or perhaps no army at some point. What assumptions are built into that 
conclusion? First, that the aspiring fighters can get to the battlefield, which in this case, 
means they know how to evade detection of law enforcement and where to go when they 
arrive in country. How would they know how to do this? Presumably, someone is directing 
them or they are somehow receiving instructions. Therefore, stopping the flow of this 
information could lead to fewer aspiring fighters reaching the battlefield. This assumption 
is actionable, as represented by the orange bar in Figure 2 and law enforcement could do 
something to impact the objective. The next question is whether a counter-messaging 
campaign is the best action to take to stop the flow of information. No, probably not. 
Counter-messaging does not eliminate the alternative messages; it simply counters them, 
so that is not useful for the actionable assumption in Branch 1. However, there are 
alternative actions law enforcement could take, and in fact, the belief that the information 
supply can and should be cut off from would be fighters generated a good deal of debate 
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and led to the criticism of social media companies for their perceived lack of 
responsiveness to shutting down IS accounts.70  
As Branch 1 cannot be addressed through counter-messaging, consider Branch 2. 
This assumption is of a different nature; it is causal rather than outcomes based, so the 
approach here is to ask why do we think we can end recruitment? Branch 2 answers with, 
because we believe that we understand why people want to go and fight. Built into this 
approach is the belief that these reasons are generalizable or trendable, and therefore, a 
broadly appealing counter-point can be offered. The actionable assumption is that a 
counter-message can be developed by law enforcement and homeland security officials 
that will inhibit recruitment. So, what efficacy might a counter-message campaign have 
based on these assumptions? The literature offers a few points to consider.  
First, the idea that “we understand why people want to go and fight” borders on 
other disproved theories about the so-called “root causes” of terrorism. There remains a 
pervasive belief that terrorism has its roots is socio-economic and geo-political issues of 
poverty, lack of upward mobility, perceptions of government ineptitude and corruption, 
lack of redress in the government system, and other associated problems commonly found 
in underdeveloped nations.71 Evidence of this belief can be seen in the State Department 
and United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) Joint Strategy on 
Countering Violent Extremism both as explicit statements and through the objectives set 
forth and funded by the agency.72 Applied to the domestic space, this is visible when people 
talk about IS recruits as being “marginalized” or “failures,” and data proves this assumption 
 
70 Peter Bergen, Hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs. Jihad 2.0: Social Media in the Next Evolution of Terrorist Recruitment, Senate, 114th Cong., 1st 
sess., May 7, 2015), 4–18, https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Testimony-Bergen-2015-05-
07.pdf. 
71 Tore Bjørgo, Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities, and Ways Forward (London: Routledge, 
2005), 33–42; Christmann, “Preventing Religious Radicalisation,” 24–26.  
72 Department of State and USAID, Joint Strategy on CVE (Washington, DC: Department of State and 
USAID, 2016, 3–7, https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PBAAE503.pdf. 
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is not true. IS does not just recruit mentally ill, marginalized, social outcasts; most of the 
250 had jobs, educational opportunities, hobbies, and friends.73  
Second, Branch 2 reflects a built-in assumption that whatever is known about why 
individuals travel can be generalized across a large and diverse population. Commonly 
accepted principles of research and the literature strongly discredits this assumption.74 As 
previously discussed, there is little similarity in the group of travelers from the US besides 
a tendency to be young and male.75 Furthermore, as noted earlier, there is a significant bias 
in the rather limited data law enforcement can access. Notably, it only reflects those who 
actually attempted to or succeeded in traveling. The sample does not include everyone who 
outright rejected recruitment attempts or those who considered it, but then ultimately 
declined to travel. Since this data is not ever likely to be available to law enforcement, it 
means whatever understanding of motivations does exist, it will always be at best 
incomplete. As important as positive motivators are, an understanding of why people 
rejected recruitment and travel is equally, if not more, meaningful when considering a 
counter-messaging campaign. Further discussion about how messaging is part of 
radicalization and identity development is presented under objective two.  
Third, and perhaps most significantly, Branch 2 encapsulates the assumption that 
the government is capable of crafting the right message and delivering it to the right 
individuals at the right time to effectively stop them, which may generously be called a 
“needle in the haystack” fallacy. Supposing that the target audience can even be effectively 
identified, revisiting the discussion from Chapter III on narratives and credibility, it is 
reasonably unlikely that a message presented by the government will be considered a 
credible source to an individual considering travel overseas to join a “caliphate” dedicated 
to fighting this same government. Presumably, this is why the Department of Homeland 
 
73 Meleagrou-Hitchens, Hughes, and Clifford, The Travelers, 16; Jenkins, The Origins, 20; 
Christmann, “Preventing Religious Radicalisation,” 23.  
74 Applying extremely small sample findings across an entire population is known as external validity; 
it is a known flaw and bias.  
75 Meleagrou-Hitchens, Hughes, and Clifford, The Travelers, 16; Jenkins, The Origins, 20; 
Christmann, “Preventing Religious Radicalisation,” 23.  
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Security’s (DHS’) current efforts in counter-messaging focus on using “community 
voices,” but since the government funds these voices, they too are likely to be discredited.76 
From a positive vantage point, the communications literature offers that if a 
campaign were to focus specifically on deterring travel, not on any underlying causes, the 
scope is narrow enough for a viable behavior-change campaign. Such an effort is 
comparable to smoking cessation where the campaign is designed to influence young 
people away from dangerous behaviors. With smoking, besides social costs, there are 
tangible consequences such as the loss of personal income on high cigarette taxes and long-
term health costs. The same would be true with attempting to travel overseas; there are 
tangible consequences like serious criminal penalties if caught. Research validates that 
anti-smoking campaigns have demonstrated success, but over many decades, and as a part 
of comprehensive programs.77 Recommendations based on the success of these campaigns 
include achieving high message exposure rates in the target audience over a sustained 
period of time, making a significant long-term investment in the campaign, and expecting 
change to occur over a generation, as opposed to in the near-term. These recommendations 
provide some insight into what may be required to run a successful counter-message 
campaign for aspiring foreign travelers.  
Ultimately, while deterring travel overseas to join IS may be a very appropriate law 
enforcement goal, and even theoretically an achievable one, the likelihood that law 
enforcement or homeland security officials will craft a credible message and be able deliver 
it to the target audience with sufficient exposure to generate meaningful results is very low. 
Capturing any data that contributes to even probabilistic assessment of success is also very 
unlikely; proof of causality or even correlation cannot be determined without follow-on 
qualitative fieldwork to confirm any potential trends.  
 
76 To the point made by Southers in the report on CVE in Minneapolis, it also assumes the government 
funds the right community voices and that the government is capable of determining who has authenticity 
to the community.  
77 Melanie Wakefield et al., “Effects of Anti-Smoking Advertising on Youth Smoking: A Review,” 
Journal of Health Communication International Perspectives 8, no. 3 (2003): 229–247; Sarah Durkin, 
Emily Brennan, and Melanie Wakefield, “Mass Media Campaigns to Promote Smoking Cessation among 
Adults: An Integrative Review,” Tobacco Control 21, no. 2 (2012): 127–138.  
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Grade: appropriateness of objective for law enforcement: Strong; efficacy of 
counter-messaging in achieving objective: Weak  
B. OBJECTIVE TWO: STOP RADICALIZATION 
Addressing radicalization to violence and recruitment in the information 
space is a key piece of any serious, meaningful, and enduring approach to 
countering violent extremism long-term. 
—Meagen M. LaGraffe Chief of Staff, Global Engagement Center78 
 
Curtailing radicalization is a broader societal issue, although certainly, the outcome 
of radicalization when also mobilized to violence is a law enforcement problem. Since 
9/11, research on radicalization has flourished as government priorities focused on 
understanding the radicalization process in hopes of finding a means to disrupt it. A great 
deal of misconceptions remain about radicalization, particularly in policy circles and 
several of these feature prominently in the ideas and assumptions about counter-messaging 
and its possible role in countering radicalization. Figure 3 presents the thought diagram of 
the radicalization goal.  
 
78 Meagan M. LaGraffe, ISIS Online: Countering Terrorist Radicalization and Recruitment on the 





Figure 3. Stop Radicalization Problem/Assumption Diagram. 
Bound up in the idea that ending radicalization is a worthwhile objective from a 
law enforcement and homeland security perspective, as opposed to a social one, is the 
belief that radicalization and violence are one and the same. Branch 1 reflects this 
assumption, as radicalized people are a threat. Why, because to mobilize to violence 
someone has to radicalize first, ipso facto, radicalized people must be dangerous. There is 
nothing specifically actionable about this belief. It is simply offered as a justification for 
counter-radicalization programs as an outright fact. However, there is no evidence to 
support this belief. It is possible for persons to hold radical ideas without acting upon them 
violently; conversely, it is possible for persons to be violent without espousing radical 
ideas.79 Conflating the two concepts—radicalization and mobilizing to violence—impedes 
efforts to address them, as they are separate, although sometimes overlapping, paths.  
Related to this idea that radicalized people are a threat is the idea reflected in Branch 
2; that radicalization is contagious, meaning it can spread throughout a community like a 
virus. This particular simile appears often in the language used to describe radicalization. 
For example, Professor Peter Bergen from New America describes radicalization in 
Congressional testimony as, “Think of ISIS as a pathogen that preys on weak hosts in the 
 
79 Mohammed Hafez and Creighton Mullins, “The Radicalization Puzzle: A Theoretical Synthesis of 
Empirical Approaches to Homegrown Extremism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 38, no. 11 
(September 2015): 958–975.  
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Muslim world. In fact, there is something of a law: The weaker the Muslim state the 
stronger will be the presence of ISIS or like-minded groups.”80 There are two adjacent 
assumptions related to this virology theory of radicalization. The first is that visible signs 
or symptoms of radicalization would necessarily signal the need for intervention. The 
second is that there is an intervention that can effectively stop the “spread.” This approach 
leads to the actionable assumption (noted by the orange bar) that a counter-messaging 
campaign is one such intervention, which could perhaps behave like a drug acting to 
destroy the “bad” radical ideology. Intertwined with these two assumptions are ideas about 
the internet and social media and their role in the spread of radical ideas.81 A closely 
associated belief as shown in Branch 3 is that it is possible to prevent radicalization in the 
first place. Again, the question asked is why do we think we can prevent radicalization, and 
the answer, because we know what causes it. Present again is the belief that these causes 
coalesce into useful patterns or trends upon which predictions can be made about who is 
at-risk for radicalization, and therefore, a broadly appealing counter-message can be 
designed for this audience. So, what is the efficacy of either Branch 2 or Branch 3 counter-
messaging? The literature has much to offer.  
Radicalization is truly a complex problem. It is a process comprised of multiple 
independent variables that interact with each other in unpredictable ways, constantly 
changing and re-shaping the individual.82 Like other complex problems, it is two seemingly 
contrary things at once; it is simultaneously an extremely individual and a highly socialized 
 
80 Peter Bergen, ISIS Online: Countering Terrorist Radicalization and Recruitment on the Internet and 
Social Media, Testimony before U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security, Permanent Subcommittee 
on Investigations, Senate, 114th Cong., 2nd sess., 11, July 6, 2016. 
81 To prove this point, look no further than the title of hearing in which Bergen made the statement ISIS 
Online… 
82 Complex or wicked problems are different from complicated, linear problems in that it is not 
possible to predict how the independent variables will interact with each other. For example, imagine many 
cars at an intersection with no road signs. As cars and pedestrians move through, it would be impossible to 
determine the specific path any one car or person would take before they started because each other car or 
person interacting with them will change their trajectory. The variables are responsive to each other in 
unknowable ways, causing the whole traffic system to change.  
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process, and for this reason, predicting or trending radicalization has proven impossible.83 
Consistent with a complex problem, if and when signs of radicalization are visible, they 
are often meaningless until action occurs. They only have value as indicators in hindsight, 
which is to say they can confirm but not predict radicalization. Nevertheless, there are 
dozens of models of radicalization, each with its own method and utility.84 Broadly 
speaking, they coalesce around the idea that there are pre-existing factors (indicators) that 
for some individuals when presented with a trigger, catalyze a complex interaction where 
new ideas about self are explored, tested, rejected, and refined through socialization until 
a new sense of identity emerges. As every individual’s radicalization process is unique, the 
usefulness of these models lies predominantly in their ability to explain, not to predict. 
Work being done today enables a potential future state in the modeling science of 
radicalization; it remains unknown if the data will ever have predictive value but it certainly 
cannot if no researcher lays the groundwork. Policymakers unfortunately appear to confuse 
these purposes.  
Communications as a process is a key facilitator of radicalization because it is the 
primary means by which people and groups create and express identity.85 In other words, 
by talking about who they are and want to be with others, people either support or amend 
their idea of themselves. Many misleading ideas about radicalization stem from 
misunderstandings about the role communications can or does play in an individual’s 
journey to radicalize. Figure 4 illustrates the high-level relationships between 
communications as a process and radicalization as a process. Its purpose is not to model 
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radicalization but rather to illustrate the partnership between these processes at various 
stages in an individual’s journey.  
Figure 4 shows an individual with some or many pre-existing factors (i.e., personal 
change, social grievance) that when triggered lead them to desire a change in themselves 
or their life. This presents a cognitive opening where the individual’s identity becomes 
fluid (in varying degrees, depending on the individual) and they begin to seek out or 
respond to ideas about who they are and who they could or should be. This is a point during 
which recruiters hope to engage people, because in theory, new ideas of self can be 
incorporated into the existing identity.86 Also, at this point, communications plays a 
significant facilitation role since seeking and receiving ideas may include for example: 
talking to others, consuming digital media (i.e., videos, online materials, social media 
accounts), or reading. As new ideas are presented, they are checked against the “me” 
identity as defined by the consumer and are either discarded outright or considered and 
incorporated to some degree. As this process is repeated, a tentative identity emerges and 
the individual may begin to test it. At this juncture, communication becomes important 
again, as the person may do or say things that align with their new sense of self, i.e., post 
very religious statements, share pro-IS media, or dress differently. However, in some cases, 
individuals show no outward signs of their inward transformation. Individuals at this point 
in their journey are mostly likely to seek validation and recruiters work to isolate them 
from the groups that normally provide it (i.e., family and friends, and replace them with a 
new radicalized group).87 If the recruiter is successful, and the do/say actions, the 
individual emerges with a new radicalized identity.  
  
 
86 Recall that IS uses anchoring as a framing technique in their messaging and this is a powerful way to 
link old ideas of self to new ideas of self. 
87 To put this concept in social identity terms, a new in-group is created of other like-minded, 
radicalizing persons who replace the previous in-group of friends or family. It is critical to recognize how 
incredibly small this potential pool of like-minded people is; nationwide, about five percent of American 
Muslims are sympathetic to violent jihadist ideas. That’s equivalent to about 165,000 people, only one 





Figure 4. Radicalization Milestones and Communications Processes. 
Between deciding that they are open to changing their definition of self and 
crystalizing a new “radicalized” identity, an individual may take an infinite number of 
paths. They may spend varying degrees of time at each milestone in their transformation; 
they may skip or repeat portions. They may become dormant for a time and then re-activate 
their interest when additional triggers impact them. It should be clearly understood then 
that radicalization is not a linear process and communications parallels it; that is to say, for 
every individual, the role and nature of communications is as unique as the pathway to 
radicalization.  
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Yet, policymakers have persistently believed that it is possible to prevent or 
intervene in this process. (Off-ramping and de-radicalization are discussed under objective 
three.) Since messaging is a key partner to the radicalization process, the prevailing logic 
has been that counter-messaging can work to stop radicalization in the first place. Given 
what is known about radicalization and the complexity of the process, it is pretty clear that 
counter-messaging is not likely to be an effective tool. Because radicalization is a social 
process, a third party (from the out-group) cannot offer meaningful messages about who 
an individual is, could, or should be. Interestingly, there is strong evidence that officials 
fully comprehend this concept. For example, the 2011 White House CVE strategy 
explicitly states, “Government will often be ill-suited to intervene in the niches of society 
where radicalization to violence takes place.”88 Yet, the same document goes on to say, 
“We must actively and aggressively counter the range of ideologies violent extremists 
employ to radicalize and recruit individuals by challenging justifications for violence and 
by actively promoting the unifying and inclusive vision of our American ideals.”89 This 
cognitive dissonance suggests that deeply entrenched biases are inhibiting an evidence-
based approach to this issue.  
Beyond whether or not it is possible, a compelling case can be made that preventing 
radicalization is an extremely inappropriate goal for law enforcement and homeland 
security officials. By virtue of the First Amendment, radical ideas are not illegal, and the 
people espousing them cannot and should not be targeted for believing them. The inherent 
consequence of conflating radicalization and violence is an invitation for law enforcement 
to be in business of policing ideas. A good example of the tension this creates is the case 
of Omar Mateen and the Pulse nightclub shooting. Mateen was under investigation for 10 
months but ultimately FBI agents were forced to close the case because no prosecutable 
 
88 White House, Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent 
Extremism in the United States (Washington, DC: White House, 2016), 3, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/
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89 White House, 6. 
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actions took place.90 Two years later, he perpetrated one of the deadliest mass shootings in 
U.S. history and claimed it for IS. However, up and until Mateen took action—i.e., 
mobilized to violence—there was no appropriate or legal role for law enforcement. 
Although law enforcement did their job, public perception failed to distinguish the radical 
ideas from the violent man and the FBI was wrongfully criticized.  
Closely associated with these ideas about radicalization is an obstinate belief that 
the internet and social media are increasing or accelerating its “spread.” In part, this belief 
also seems to be at the root of the “contagion” approach to radicalization. These beliefs are 
based on the assumption that the accessibility of information on the internet and on social 
media platforms or apps is causally related to an increase in the number of people 
radicalizing, which is simply not true.91 First, while it is true that the internet improves the 
accessibility of information, it is not true that this accessibility equates to an increase in 
information being comprehended, retained, accepted, and incorporated by an individual 
into their worldview. This long disproven belief has its roots in a theory of communications 
dating back to World War II known as “hypodermic needle effect,” which held that mass 
media messages could cause a helpless audience to do whatever the messenger pleased.92 
This theory assumed that messages had the same effect on everyone, regardless of their 
background or values, and for obvious reasons, this is not true. To put it in today’s terms, 
this theory is equivalent to believing that a “persuasive” TV commercial could cause 
everyone who saw it to buy a product, regardless of need or preference. This thinking is 
recognizable in the often parroted idea that teenagers are sitting in the basement watching 
IS YouTube videos and helplessly being transformed into radicalized lone-wolf terrorists. 
If that were so, the number of attacks occurring in the United States would be staggering.  
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Communications theory does offer an alternative explanation for how persuasive 
messaging works that more accurately reflects how and why ideas are shared and become 
“contagious.” In the real world (outside the laboratory), the decision by a message 
consumer to accept a piece of information (a message) is a function of their existing social 
and psychosocial state, i.e., their identity.93 Before being accepted or remembered, the 
message further interacts with the message consumer’s needs, wants, and ideas. The 
message must meet a need (provide gratification), reflect their existing cognitive value 
judgements, for example about how good or bad the world is, and align to their existing 
ideas about what is important or what they believe their network thinks is important.94 
Research suggests that people share those ideas or pieces of information that increase their 
social capital with their preferred network (in-group), have practical value, are related to 
everyday life, are associated with strong emotions, and are presented as stories.95 
Reflecting on how IS crafts its messages and the frames it chooses in constructing them, it 
is clear that within the target audience, many of these criteria are met. They use emotionally 
evocative stories that relate to everyday life and often have practical value. Therefore, that 
information gratifies the message consumer, increases their social capital if they share it, 
and reflects what they believe is important. Ideas spread, not because of social media 
platforms, but because they are crafted in such a way to meet the message consumer’s 
needs. Social media platforms are just communications tools; they are facilitators in the 
same way any other “traditional” platform facilitates the exchange of information. 
As a final point, it is important to recognize that ultimately research into the 
radicalization process finds that when it comes to the actual mobilization to violence, face-
to-face interaction is almost always occurring. Recruiters may use the internet to spot 
people and cultivate them as leads, but they are frequently passed off to others for personal 
interaction. Consider this statement from a study of the Minneapolis-St. Paul CVE 
program:  
 
93 Riffe, 7. 
94 Riffe, 7. 
95 Jonah Berger, Contagious (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2013).  
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In every incident reported during fieldwork, face-to-face interaction was a 
critical element of the recruitment process. Social media interaction and 
links to extremist online content reinforce the messages that recruiters offer 
in person. To be sure, digital communications plays a role in recruitment, 
but at least in the Somali community in Minneapolis-St. Paul, in-person 
interaction is irreplaceable.96 
Other case studies confirm this finding.97 Again, people are not passively surfing 
the internet and being assaulted with terrorist propaganda that infects them with radical 
ideas and turns them into a threat to the homeland. Suggesting as much greatly exaggerates 
the threat and encourages unnecessary fear and suspicion. In a Pew Research poll, 15 
percent of the American general public believed, “there was a great deal of support for 
extremism,” when in reality, only a tiny fraction of people support the use of violence.98  
Grade: appropriateness of objective for law enforcement: Very Weak; efficacy of 
counter-messaging in achieving objective: Very Weak  
C. OBJECTIVE THREE: DE-RADICALIZATION  
CVE counters the violent extremist recruitment, focusing on the root causes 
of many underlying motivations, and working to prevent those drivers, or 
provide “off-ramps” for individuals who may have taken steps toward 
embracing violent extremism. 
—George Selim, Director DHS Office of Community Partnerships99 
 
Where ending radicalization suggests invention before ideas take hold, de-
radicalization or “off-ramping” refers to interventions that occur once radicalization is on-
going or complete. Discussions about the de-radicalization or rehabilitation of those 
arrested after 9/11 for engaging in or supporting terrorism are becoming more common as 
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some prison terms come to an end. Many of the assumptions about de-radicalization are 
the same as those made about radicalization. Figure 5 presents the diagram of de-
radicalization as a goal.  
 
Figure 5. De-radicalization Problem/Assumption Diagram. 
Branches 1 and 2 repeat the ideas discussed under radicalization. However,  
Branch 3 is unique, and while some of the same conclusions are reached, the origin of the 
assumption is different. Here the question is why do we think we can deter or de-radicalize 
individuals and the answer is because we believe radicalization can be reversed. This 
conclusion presents a new question for the literature: is this possible?  
The first significant point to be made in consideration of “de-radicalization” is, 
what exactly does the term encompass? Often, “de-radicalization” refers to a whole swath 
of initiatives that include rehabilitation, disengagement, demobilization, reform, 
reintegration, or reconciliation.100 Each of these terms means something different and is 
arguably distinct, although perhaps the tangible outcomes are similar. To rehabilitate 
 
100 John Horgan and Max Taylor, “Disengagement, De-radicalizaton and the Arc of Terrorism: Future 
Directions for Research,” in Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalization Challenge: European and American 
Experiences, ed. Rik Coolsaet, 2nd ed. (London: Ashgate, 2013): 173–175.  
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someone does not require them to renounce their beliefs; whereas to reform them suggests 
an ideological change of some magnitude. Disengagement from a radical group and 
demobilization from violence or armament can also occur without requiring a person to 
reject a particular ideology. In a wholly different vein, reconciliation may imply a process 
that involves working with impacted victims or the community. It is clear then that 
depending on what the actual goal is for such efforts, the approach may be very different, 
and therefore, no practical conversation about efficacy can occur until clarity in 
terminology. For the purpose of this analysis, since it is not clear what policymakers mean 
by the term, it is used and taken literally to mean rejecting radical Islamist ideas.  
On the point of can an individual be literally de-radicalized, the evidence within the 
literature is conflicting, perhaps on account of the imprecision in terminology just 
discussed. Frequently lauded examples from Saudi Arabia and Singapore do not provide 
transparency about their programs or outcomes, and hence, cannot be realistically 
assessed.101 Studies on former Egyptian militant Islamist leaders draw competing 
conclusions with some researchers claiming successful de-radicalization and others finding 
the opposite.102 Some research attempts to compare de-radicalization programs to gang 
interventions, but there are mixed ideas about the utility of such endeavors as well.103 In 
short, there is no definitive answer; researchers can only seem to agree on the fact that more 
research is needed.  
Regardless of how possible de-radicalization is, again, it is an extremely 
inappropriate goal for law enforcement. Now, de-mobilizing someone who is violent or 
rehabilitating them into society after imprisonment to reduce recidivism (like with 
traditional crime) is different, and hence, the need for clarity in terminology. Law 
enforcement does have a role to play in processes that support disengagement from violent 
behavior and working with offenders or at-risk individuals to live peacefully in society, but 
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they do not have a role in trying to change or amend a person’s religious, social, or political 
beliefs.  
Even if this goal were appropriate, which it is not, returning to the radicalization 
process discussed under objective two, it seems extremely unlikely that any formal 
government intervention would be successful in re-directing or deterring a budding radical 
Islamist. The best point at which to “off-ramp” an individual in that process is likely to be 
in the testing phase during which a family member, mentor, cleric, or friend can possibly 
reject any unhealthy behavioral changes or ideas, but assuming that the rejecting individual 
remains influential; i.e., is still a member of the radicalizing person’s in-group. Current 
DHS and FBI CVE efforts focus on the role that family and community can play in offering 
alternatives to radicalization; however, in the case of several overseas travelers, family 
members were reluctant to step in because at the point where the individuals remained open 
to re-direction of their behavior, increased piety for example, was considered positive. It 
was only in hindsight, after they left, that it appeared problematic.104 If family could not 
conclusively identify the need for intervention, certainly a counter-messaging campaign 
with far less precision in target audience would not be useful in disrupting this process.  
Grade: appropriateness of objective for law enforcement: Very Weak; efficacy of 
counter-messaging in achieving objective: Very Weak  
D. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter set out to review each of the three objectives for U.S. counter-
messaging efforts to determine if they are appropriate and achievable. Objective one to end 
recruitment is an appropriate goal, but counter-messaging is unlikely to have much impact 
on it. Law enforcement has access to other tools that are far more likely to be influential. 
Objectives two and three to stop radicalization and de-radicalize individuals are highly 
inappropriate goals for law enforcement and counter-messaging is extremely unlikely to 
have any impact on them. These objectives share key faulty assumptions, namely that 
radicalization is causally related to violence, that the internet and social media spread 
 
104 Southers and Hienz, Foreign Fighters, 13. This hindsight bias is another clue to indicate a complex 
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radicalization that can “infect” people, and that blanket messages distributed to loosely 
targeted audiences can impact individual or group identity. Besides not having a positive 
impact, there is a subjective argument to be made that failed attempts in these endeavors 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
It was not well to drive men into final corners; at those moments they could 
all develop teeth and claws. 
—A Red Badge of Courage 
 
In the end, there is only one possible conclusion to make about domestic counter-
messaging: stop. There is simply no evidence to suggest that any current or future efforts 
will succeed. As this thesis presents, there are serious gaps in data and misunderstandings 
that contribute to persistent calls to develop such programs. A summary follows of the 
mistaken ideas that need to be eradicated from the discussion about countering violent 
extremism, radicalization, and messaging: 
• Radicalization is equivalent to violence. 
• Telltale signs, patterns, or trends about those who travel or those who 
radicalize that can be used to predict who will travel or radicalize in the 
future. 
• The internet and social media platforms increase the “spread” of 
radicalization. 
• Radicalization is contagious and it can infect people; messages can infect 
people and cause them to change their identity or behavior. 
• Broadly disseminated messages can impact individual or group identity.  
Now more than ever, a need exists to return to the basics of definitions. Often, when 
policymakers discuss counter-narratives and counter-messaging broadly, they mush 
together the global audience and the domestic one. This level of imprecision has allowed 
concepts that are effective and appropriate for U.S. diplomatic work or military efforts in 
war or conflict zones, such as COIN, PSYOPS, and MISO, to be considered in domestic 
homeland security work. By the very nature of what these programs are designed to do—
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to influence opinions about the government and gain control over the population—it is 
wildly inappropriate to apply them to one’s own people. Yet, these ideas persist and receive 
Congressional funding. It is essential that moving forward, practitioners draw a bright line 
between military information operations and domestic homeland security work.  
Furthermore, in the space of definitions, policymakers and practitioners need to 
arrive at some consensus about what “de-radicalization” means and what de-radicalization 
programs should entail. Within the coming decade, as prison sentences end for some who 
supported terrorist organizations post-9/11, there is a pressing need to consider how 
individuals will be successfully re-integrated into society. This space has perhaps the 
greatest potential to be meaningful and actionable for law enforcement and yet has the least 
research behind it. No progress can be made until there is clarity in what the terms 
associated with de-radicalization mean and which of them should apply to domestic 
programs.  
If counter-messaging is not the solution, other alternatives must be considered. It is 
clear that as vitriolic rhetoric increases and tensions around group identity rise in the United 
States, homeland security practitioners will increasingly be pressed to deal with narratives 
and the consequences that arise when narratives collide. Regardless of ideology, whether 
it is radical Islamism, white supremacy, black separatism, or anti-government militancy, 
intergroup conflict that results in violence is a genuine security risk for communities. While 
it is tempting to look to the government to shut down and counter hateful narratives that 
espouse violence, the principles of democracy demand extreme caution. Who is to be the 
arbiter of what constitutes radical thought? Is it linked to a threat assessment of some kind? 
Which government agency should have within its mission to design campaigns that inform 
the American people what they should and should not believe? If it is risk- or threat-based, 
it is likely to fall into the portfolio of law enforcement and intelligence agencies where the 
possibilities for abuse are practically limitless, even in the best of circumstances when it is 
assumed those responsible for such efforts truly have the best interests of the country at 
heart. In the end, the responsibility for countering hateful rhetoric and violent narratives 
lies with society itself in its non-profit, civic, and religious organizations, and with 
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individual people. Government leaders must take painstaking care not to enflame hate but 
there can be no government program to fight radical ideas.  
Practitioners then should do two key things. First, correct the mistaken ideas about 
radicalization and messaging when they arise, and second, be champions of evidenced-
based approaches. Misleading ideas, some that inspire fear and hate, grow stronger when 
“reasonable” people and experts do not counter them. The findings in this thesis are far 
from new; the research supporting them goes back almost a decade. It is time to pay 
attention to it; it is time to stop accepting simple explanations for complex problems. No 
simple solution exists to resolving the identity conflicts presently threatening the 
homeland, including radical Islamism.  
CVE programs offer many tempting Siren calls, a number of which contain the 
same faulty logic used to justify counter-messaging. In pursuit of meaningful programs, 
practitioners at every level can ask the questions that led the author to uncover so many 
false ideas. No one should assume that someone else has done so. (Clearly, at the highest 
levels of government, this systematically failed to occur over a period of years.) If the drive 
for data and evidence-based practices rests with only federal agencies and Congress, it will 
be a lifetime before any results are seen. However, every day, law enforcement and 
homeland security officials are working in their communities and these individuals are the 
most powerful voice for change. They must ask “why” and “how do you know” with 
greater frequency. Gaps remain in the research around CVE, but it is still worth asking 
every time, how strong is the evidence to support this idea?  
In supporting local practitioners, DHS, the FBI, the National Counterterrorism 
Center (NCTC), and Congress should re-focus and re-align their research objectives. 
Rather than looking at ways to stop “bad” ideas and attempting to pattern an empirically 
unpredictable thing, they ought to look closely at why some individuals in the “at-risk” 
category do not radicalize and what can be done in communities to strengthen these critical 
factors. The communities affected by violent ideologies are rich with examples of people 
who choose not to participate. Ask why, and how can their success be replicated?  
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Money spent on fruitless efforts to influence the American people will do nothing 
to improve national security and prolonging the myth of “yet to be seen” benefits distracts 
practitioners from finding real solutions and doing meaningful work. The bias that 
continues to drive these programs has a name: sunk cost fallacy. Senior government leaders 
need to let go of efforts that have produced nothing so their staff can re-direct towards work 
with greater possibility. Questions need to be answered about de-radicalization and its 
efficacy, about the nature of “radical ideas” and if the brain treats them differently, and 
about how people have organically defeated radicalization within at-risk communities and 
populations. It is time to stop standing beside the lamppost with a flashlight; it is necessary 
to move forward into spaces that still lay dark.  
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APPENDIX A. REVIEW OF CURRENT US PROGRAMS 
This appendix presents what is known about the programs and efforts undertaken 
from approximately 2014 to 2016 by the DHS, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the 
FBI, and the Department of State (State) across the broad category of CVE, which includes 
counter-messaging. These programs get their origin from the previously discussed 2011 
Obama administration CVE strategy Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent 
Extremism in the United States.106 Table 6 presents the funding for these programs in FY16 
derived from publicly available budget justification documents. As these documents offer 
little transparency about the specifics of how the funds are spent, it is very difficult to 
determine what percentage is used specifically for counter-messaging; nevertheless, they 
offer some sense of the U.S. investment in this arena.107  
Table 6. U.S. CVE Programs by Agency, Purpose, and Funding. 
Program Agency FY 16 Funds Description/Purpose 







Messaging campaign targeting 
international Muslim audience; video, 
twitter account, funds to third party non-
profit(s) for engagement and graphics 
Don’t Be A Puppet FBI UNK Messaging campaign for teenagers promoted through schools; online game 
CVE Program  DHS/DOJ $20M 
Law enforcement training, local CVE 
pilot program (engagement councils), 
outreach campaigns and efforts, Office 
of Community Partnerships 
 
 
106 White House, Strategic Implementation Plan, 5–6. 
107 For additional review of U.S. programs, albeit not unbiased, readers can see Patel and Koushik, 
“Countering Violent Extremism.” 
108 It is likely that the use of funds shifted from what was described in budget documents as the focus 
changed from “Think Again, Turn Around” to a more segment paid-advertising campaign. 
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The following sections review each of these programs and what is known about 
them: how they were designed, any performance measures, and how they were publicly 
received.  
A. U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
While outside the domestic mission space, and clearly, non-U.S. persons focused, 
the programs established by State come closest to a comprehensive counter-narrative 
campaign and are the best examples of the U.S. government’s efforts on this front.109 In 
2011, President Obama established the CSCC by executive order to combat radical Islamist 
messages.110 The birth of this unit coincided with the White Houses’ release of a strategy 
for CVE (see other federal programs). The first effort from this office was what is referred 
to cynically as the “Happy Muslim” campaign, a failed paid advertising segment that 
featured Muslims happily living the quintessential American life.111 The ads were 
supposed to run in traditionally Muslim countries including across much of the Middle East 
but were canceled after heavy criticism. The intent according to State was to show a unity 
of values shared between American Muslims and other Muslims abroad.  
Subsequently, in 2015, the CSCC launched a second campaign called “Think 
Again, Turn Around” that featured a parody video with the tagline “Run don’t walk to ISIS 
land,” which attempted to juxtapose IS propaganda claims against reality. It also included 
a Twitter handle that engaged in direct communications with IS sympathizers and 
 
109 According to the State Department’s website, the Global Engagement Center specifically intends to 
influence foreign audiences abroad, making it technically outside the scope of this study. However, it is not 
only one of the only coordinated counter-narrative efforts; it has existed the longest and produced the most 
product for consideration.  
110 Barack Obama, Executive Order 13584, “Developing an Integrated Strategic Counterterrorism 
Communications Initiative and Establishing a Temporary Organization to Support Certain Government-
wide Communications Activities Directed Abroad,” Code of Federal Regulations, title 3 (2011): 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2011/09/15/2011-23891/developing-an-integrated-strategic-
counterterrorism-communications-initiative-and-establishing-a; Barack Obama, Executive Order 13721, 
“Developing an Integrated Global Engagement Center to Support Government-wide Counterterrorism 
Communications Activities Directed Abroad and Revoking Executive Order 13584,” Code of Federal 
Regulations, title 3 (2016): https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/03/17/2016-06250/
developing-an-integrated-global-engagement-center-to-support-govern 
ment-wide-counterterrorism. 
111 Claire Cozens, “U.S. Scraps Muslim Ad Campaign,” Guardian, January 17, 2003, 
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2003/jan/17/advertising.  
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associates online. The goal of these materials was to expose IS propaganda by emphasizing 
its brutality and hypocrisy (see Chapter II on Narratives). Widely criticized and mocked by 
IS with a counter-parody video, the campaign brought about the end of the CSCC, which 
was replaced with the Global Engagement Center (GEC). At this point, State shifted most 
of its efforts away from direct messaging to supporting influential voices, such as the 
International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism.112 These materials often featured 
defector’s stories and other facts focused content. It is difficult to determine the level of 
funding provided to these groups due to the complexity and limited transparency in 
publicly available budget documents. 
Figure 6 from the GEC website is a representative sample of the video content 
produced by the CSCC and the GEC prior to 2017. Each video garnered on average a few 
hundred to a few thousand views and were of relatively low production quality. As noted 
previously, they predominantly feature defector narratives and attempt to directly challenge 
claims made by IS in its media.  
 




Figure 6. Global Engagement Center Video Content (Old).113 
Moving forward, in 2017, the GEC began using Facebook data and direct marketing 
(paid advertising) to specifically target vulnerable Muslim youth abroad with anti-IS video 
content.114 The new campaign features animated characters and runs in numerous 
languages. It is pushed directly to the devices of youth meeting a set of criteria based on 
content consumption and searches. Although it is not possible to prove this campaign has 
in fact deterred recruitment, the videos have been viewed over 14 million times, which 
certainly suggests some degree of market penetration.  
Even though State’s work is entirely outward facing, the evolution of its programs 
reflects hard-earned lessons learned and should not be discarded. In its early failed 
attempts, clues about the importance of the authenticity of the speaker, the imperative of 
translation, and the appropriate application of symbolism through imagery are visible. The 
newer campaign with its audience driven push tactics is a better example of good counter-
 
113 Source: “Global Engagement Center,” YouTube, video, accessed July 7, 2017, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-wmdEFvsY0E. This link states the video is unavailable and also states 
“This video is private.” 
114 John Warrick, “How a U.S. Team Uses Facebook Guerilla Marketing to Peel of Potential ISIS 




messaging and is a good starting point to building a larger, more robust effort for foreign 
audiences.  
B. FBI 
The FBI runs the only domestic facing counter-narrative campaign in the portfolio. 
The “Don’t Be a Puppet” campaign is an anti-radicalization web-based game platform 
targeting at-risk teenagers. It was launched with a particular emphasis on working through 
the school system. According to a study by the Brennan Center for Justice, this program 
included a “Preventing Violent Extremism in Schools” guide and instructed school 
administrators that there was “an emerging trend of young people embracing violent radical 
ideologies.”115 While the content does not explicitly say the target audience is young 
Muslims, teachers associations and Muslim organizations were outraged, calling the effort 
“ideological policing and surveillance” within schools.116 Based on the content alone, these 
complaints are unfounded as Figures 7 and 8 clearly show that the website addresses all 
types of extremism, not just religious extremism. However, the perception likely comes 
from the outreach strategy and rollout approach; the launch and promotion efforts appeared 
to concentrate on areas with considerable Muslim populations, such as Minneapolis-St. 
Paul. The FBI has remained silent on the effort, as has Congress. There is no accessible 
public data regarding the cost of the program or its reach.  
 
115 Patel and Koushik, “Countering Violent Extremism,” 22–23. 
116 Mazin Sidahmed, “FBI’s Don’t Be a Puppet Targets Muslim Youth, Teacher’s Union Says,” 




Figure 7. Don’t Be A Puppet Screenshot—How Do Violent 
Extremists Make Contact?117 
 
Figure 8. Don’t Be A Puppet Screenshot—What is Violent 
Extremism?118 
 
117 Source: “FBI Don’t Be a Puppet,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed August 20, 2016, 
https://cve.fbi.gov/how/. 
118 Source: “What is Violent Extremism?” Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed August 20, 2016, 
https://cve.fbi.gov/whatis/. 
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C. DHS/DOJ PILOT PROGRAMS 
DHS and DOJ have quietly funded pilot programs in several major U.S. cities 
around community-led CVE. The stated purpose of these efforts was to initiate community 
conversations about radicalization. Very little documentation is available with regard to 
these programs except a few references to them in a comprehensive CVE literature review 
by START.119 As budget line items, the programs are described as efforts to train and 
educate law enforcement and foster community discussions. They also include efforts to 
fund community voices to engage in domestic counter-messaging, such as a youth anti-IS 
video competition. Little detail is provided, so it is difficult to know what percentage of 
the funds shown in Table 6 are actually committed to messaging exclusively; presumably 
rather little.120 The Muslim community appears fairly skeptical about the true intention of 
the programs; the lack of transparency about content and outcomes makes it difficult to 
address their concerns.  
D. SUMMARY 
In total, these efforts have all been widely criticized by various private non-profit 
organizations, the press, and some members of Congress.121 As noted earlier, a 2016 report 
from the House Homeland Security Committee criticized the efforts of the Obama 
Administration by claiming it failed to address domestic radicalization.122 Around the same 
time, Congress commissioned the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to fully audit 
 
119 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Surveying CVE 
Metrics in Prevention, Disengagement, and Deradicalization Programs (College Park, MD: National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2016), 2, https://www.start.umd.edu/
pubs/START_SurveyingCVEMetrics_March2016.pdf. 
120 Susan B. Epstein, Marian L. Lawson, and Cory R. Gill, Congressional Budget Justification: 
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, CRS Report No. R44391 (Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017), 15–16, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44391.pdf; Office of 
Justice Programs, FY 2017 Budget Request at a Glance (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2017), 5, 
https://www.justice.gov/jmd/file/822111/download. 
121 It is worth noting that similar efforts in the United Kingdom have also faced stiff criticism, despite 
the greater occurrence of attacks there, as have fledging efforts in Canada and Australia. For all these cases, 
the United States included, it is difficult to determine the fairness of the claims because little to no data is 
available to review.  
122 House Homeland Security Committee, A National Strategy to Win the War against Islamic Terror, 
2.  
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all CVE programs and tasks assigned under the 2011 strategy and Strategic Implementation 
Plan (SIP). GAO collected outcome data and progress reports from each agency with 
assigned tasks and the auditors also conducted interviews with key personnel. Released in 
April 2017, the GAO report provides the most comprehensive empirical assessment of U.S. 
efforts in the CVE and counter-messaging mission space to date; its concerning 
conclusions were presented in the Executive Summary. As an explanation for the lack of 
conclusive findings and measures, the auditors describe how the assessment working group 
responsible for developing an assessment process for the 2011 SIP was never implemented, 
and consequently, no performance measurements or assessment was conducted until 
NCTC initiated a voluntary cross-agency review in 2015.123  
As it relates to messaging specifically, the tasks assigned to DHS were reported as 
status “needs attention,” confirming no major work had been conducted in counter-
messaging domestically. There are other tasks aligned with the pilot programs that border 
on messaging, such as NCTC’s community awareness briefing (CAB), but absent visibility 




123 House Homeland Security Committee, 19.  
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APPENDIX B. METHODOLOGY  
At its inception, the purpose of this study was to determine if counter-messaging is 
a practical tool for countering domestic Islamist extremism. As discussed earlier, criticism 
of the U.S. effort against IS has been incisive and persistent. Using IS as a representative 
of the broader group of Islamist extremists, this study began with the origin question, is the 
U.S. actually failing with regards to counter-messaging for this audience? From the onset, 
there were significant challenges in answering this question. Foremost among these, no 
public strategy exists for counter-messaging, and consequently, no published objectives or 
data on the programs. Lacking this information, it is impossible to determine an answer 
empirically. Figure 9 reflects how the question of failure was initially presented and 
explored.  
 
Figure 9. Original Research. 
After arriving at these findings, a natural next step was to ask why does the United 
States believe it is failing, followed with could it ever succeed? This pair of questions is 
what this paper answers, and in so doing, exposes a number of logical fallacies and 
misconceptions that are more clearly visible when logic is systemically applied to the 
issues. Figure 10 shows the progression of the second main research question.  
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Figure 10. Second Research Question. 
This paper includes five streams of research combined together. It contains within 
it a program analysis of U.S. CVE programs, a policy analysis of U.S. government 
messaging for radical Islamism, a comprehensive five field literature, an original review of 
IS messages (using the framework method), and a root cause analysis of strategy and 
objectives in counter-messaging. These five parts were not all originally in the research 
plan but they become necessary as the work progressed. They were therefore not conducted 
in a linear progression from research question to conclusion; rather, the research process 
was more exploratory and wandered off at times to develop a more complete understanding 
of sticky wickets as they were uncovered. The simplest way to present the methodologies 
then is to do so by component; the five research streams are explained in the following 
sections.  
A. PROGRAM ANALYSIS 
The first of all the research undertaken was the program analysis. The program 
analysis began with the collection of publicly available information about existing CVE 
programs and especially any counter-narrative or counter-messaging programs. No specific 
scoping restrictions were applied. Generally, the author focused on guiding strategy 
documents, budget justifications, program descriptions and any visible outcomes, and 
empirical reviews of the programs. Fewer documents were available on the topic than 
might be desired; however, since the program analysis itself was not the primary goal of 
this paper, no interviews were conducted and no specific documents were requested from 
the agencies reviewed. The GAO report, which included both interviews and extensive data 
calls, served as a reasonable substitute. To further the author’s understanding, the sample 
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for review was expanded from its initial set of documents to include testimony and news 
articles. This review’s conclusions from are presented in Appendix A. 
B. COMPREHENSIVE LITERATURE REVIEW 
Second, although at times simultaneous to the program analysis, a literature review 
across five fields was conducted that included political communications, strategic 
communications, political science, sociology, and terrorism studies. Initially, the literature 
review was scoped with key words or phrases, such as, “radicalization” “internet and 
radicalization,” “messaging,” “message framing,” “(IS/ISIL/Daesh/ISIS) 
communications,” and “digital communications and terrorism.” From these types of 
searches, core articles and books were collected that the author used to expand the review 
by using works cited and works referenced lists. Several iterations of expansion yielded 
the final set of literature reviewed, around 100 some publications including several 
comprehensive and meta-literature reviews.  
The original purpose of the literature review was simply to check the field and 
confirm that widely accepted ideas were accurate. As it became obvious that this 
assumption was not true, the literature review grew in size and significance as evidence in 
favor of or against specific ideas was sought out from multiple sources. Once the 
assumptions and most likely objectives were identified, the literature review served as the 
primary source of evidence to validate or invalidate various ideas.  
C. IS NARRATIVE STUDY 
For a separate project prior to this paper, the author conducted original research on 
IS message frames. As this thesis developed, it became evident that there was utility in 
introducing this research, even though it was not published. For the message frame project, 
a sample of English-language IS media was collected in 2016 via open source online 
searches on YouTube, Twitter, Instagram, and Google. These searches yielded a set of stills 
and videos that the author viewed preliminarily for coding using the framework 
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methodology.124 Table 7 presents the first round of coding with “Initial Categories” and 
the “Description” or the specific items that led to category selection along with “Sub-
Categories,” which make note of major themes to be explored in second round analysis.  











Warriors of God   
Imagery of battle 
Military  






















n of statehood 











Quality of life 










124 Joanna Smith and Jill Firth, “Qualitative Data Analysis: The Framework Approach,” Nurse 
Researcher 18, no. 2 (January 21, 2011): 52–62, DOI: 10.7748/nr2011.01.18.2.52.c8284. 
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Due to the very large volume of data available, after the first screening, the author 
selected a sample of 14 videos and 18 photos generally representative of the initial code 
categories but also diverse and conducted detailed coding.125 In the detailed coding, the 
author separated findings into two sets of matrices, frames and framing techniques. Table 
8 shows the coding matrix for frames and presents the markers the author used when coding 
in detail. Table 9 goes on to identify the final outcome of coding with themes. The author 
also reviewed existing literature to compare findings prior to naming the themes.  
Table 8. Code Matrix: Markers for Coding with Preliminary Categories. 
Description of Identifiers for Coding Initial Categories 
Dialogue/Words Images  
Confrontational 
jihad, enemy, battle, war  
 
Anti-US, anti-West, anti-Israel 
U.S., Saudi Arabia, UN, Jews, enemy 
banners 
 
Against God  
kuffar, unworthy, unrighteous, evil, 
Shia, apostate 
 
Warriors of God 
martyr, lions, faithful  
Imagery of Battle 
battles/conflict, military victory, 
desecration of the enemy and enemy 
soldiers, killing of captured enemies 
and/or spies 
 
Military/Display of Weapons 
weapons, training, soldiers in 











Religious Foundations/Basis  
religious text/scripture reading or 
quotes, the Caliphate 
 
Piety  
the Prophet, Sharia, religious calls to 
action (to join), charity, mercy  
Pious Practices 
prayer, niqab, burqa, reading or 
reciting text, charity gifts 
 
Religious Institutions  









with piety  
 
125 See Appendix B Supplement for a list of assets accessed. The author screened out a number of 
execution videos, which represent a fair portion of available data for analysis in an effort to find examples 
of government administration and piety. The total sample reflects a balance of themes but is not weighted 
to the proportion of representation in the total media content.  
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Description of Identifiers for Coding Initial Categories 
Government Administration  
the Caliphate, structure of government, 
government offices, purpose and 
function of offices  
Functioning State 
Infrastructure, government officials 




happy children, traffic, full markets, 






Crime and Punishment 
justice, rule of law, courts 
 
Sharia/Holy Law 
Administration of Punishments 
executions, stoning, lashes, 







Table 9. IS Message Frames Framework for Analysis. 
Identifying Markers Used in Coding Initial Categories Themes Frames 
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Statehood based 
































With regard to framing techniques, the author first reviewed relevant literature and 
then selected six techniques to look for when coding in the second review.126 The author 
selected framing techniques based strongly on a model from Fairhurst and Sarr, although 
in some cases, they were renamed or combined to make them clearer for this paper. Table 
10 presents the coding matrix used for framing techniques in the detailed analysis. The first 
column “Techniques” names the six techniques chosen while the “Description” column 
identifies the code markers associated with each frame. Since framing techniques are 
primarily used to impart an emotion into a message, coding for them is fairly subjective. 
The author coded based on her perception of emotion and a different researcher might 
 
126 Gail Fairhurst and Robert A. Sarr, The Art of Framing: Managing the Language of Leadership (San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1996), 125–126. 
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perceive different emotional connotations. For this reason, the author tried to give 
examples of how each technique could be recognized.  




 Sounds Like/Looks Like Feels 
Metaphor 
Analogous, this is like that 
 
Ex. re-enacted battles of the Crusades 
with narration describing current 
enemies 
Contextual, amplifies the 
surrounding emotion 
Storytelling 
Tales of greatness, mythological in 
proportion, prophetic- destined,  
 
Ex. Battle of Dabiq, apocalypse, Mahdi 





Reference to historically grounded ritual, 
ceremony, practice, events to impart 
meaning  
 
Ex. Sharia, historic battles, glory of 
Islam  
Connected to the past, 
grounded, holy, sacred, 
ancient, ancestral, inherited  
Artifact/Symbolis
m 
Use of an object or reference that confers 
additional meaning  
 
Ex. holy leaders, holy places, victories, 
American flag, ISIL flag, mountains, lion  
Contextual, implied emotion 
Spin 
An representation of exclusively the 
positive or negative of something  
 
Ex. ‘there are no innocents’   
Contextual, amplifies the 
surrounding emotion 
Political Jamming 
A form of satire akin to what is 
traditionally called “propaganda” where 
symbols are reframed to mock the 
originator 
 
Ex. Suicide Squad, London Falls 
Humorous, sarcastic, ironic 
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There are some notable limitations to this research. First, Arabic language skills 
and a thorough understanding of Islam are required to make the most informed coding 
decisions. As much of the decision in coding is subjective, and many of the markers are 
nuanced, the author felt at a great disadvantage in not having a strong background in 
regional history, the languages, and the appropriate cultural and religious context. Second, 
the potential sample size for a project is enormous; determining how to select the sample 
and identifying what is a sufficient sample size remain difficult, particularly for data 
requiring trending. In this regard, different samples might yield different outcomes that 
could be perceived as contradictory findings. As the material is often pulled down, it is 
rather challenging to research it effectively on a small scale.  
D. POLICY ANALYSIS FOR U.S. COUNTER-MESSAGES 
After introducing the IS message frame data described in the previous section, the 
author determined it was necessary to attempt a scaled back version of analysis for U.S. 
messages. A policy review of Presidential and Cabinet level speeches over the previous 
three administrations was therefore initiated. The same code process was used, but the 
sample size was much smaller. The same framing techniques were drawn upon, and 
although the results are less comprehensive, they do have an evidence base. The results of 
that research are presented immediately following the section on IS messages.  
E. ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS 
In bringing everything together, the final portion of the research was the root cause 
analysis. The author took the results from the program analysis, the policy analysis, and 
the literature review, and developed a framework of likely objectives and asked “why” 
until all the assumptions that belied them had emerged. Table 11 maps these assumptions 
that are ultimately validated or invalidated against the literature. The findings are presented 
in detail in Chapter IV.  
These assumptions are important to understand because they are the theoretical 
foundation on which the United States built its CVE programs, and subsequently, 
diagnosed its own failure. Table 11 deconstructs public statements made by senior leaders 
regarding the outcome of either IS or U.S. engagement in counter-messaging and aligns 
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them with the two most common associated ideas, along with the evidence cited by the 
source to support them. The table then aligns each set of statements with influencing ideas 
that are either directly or indirectly inferred to be causally related to the statement by the 
source. In other words, these ideas are the assumptions that bridge the statement and 
supporting evidence to the conclusions drawn. Finally, the table shows the conclusion or 
recommendations made by the source. In some cases, the conclusions are implied where in 
others they are explicitly stated. In total, the table shows a set of entwined beliefs that when 
aligned to the facts in subsequent chapters, are unable to withstand scrutiny.  
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Table 11. Root Cause Analysis Map of Rationale behind U.S. Counter-messaging Efforts Constructed from Analysis of 
Official Sources. 
Sample Statement Key Idea Supporting Evidence Measures Influencing Ideas Conclusions for Action 
“Today’s terror surge 
has serious 




efforts to send 
operatives to our 
territory, and they are 
influencing 
individuals already 
here to carry out acts 
of terror.”139 
Radical/extreme 







- Number of plots or 
attacks 
- Losses from plots 
or attacks 
- Costs of preventing 
loss from plots or 
attacks 
Radicalization is causally 
related to violence. 
It is possible to de-
radicalization people; de-
radicalization will reduce 
loss (attacks/plots).  
Losses/potential losses 
from attacks carried out by 
Islamist extremists are 
substantial.  
“ISIL’s widespread 
reach through the 
Internet and social 
media is most 
concerning, as the 
group has proven 
dangerously 
competent at 
employing such tools 
for its nefarious 
strategy.”140 
IS is uniquely 
successful at 
radicalizing 
individuals to follow 
an extreme form of 
Islam.  
Successful 
recruitment of U.S. 
persons to ‘join’ IS 
- Number of U.S. 
persons recruited 
- Followership of 
U.S. persons  The Internet and social 
media is accelerating 
radicalization and 
increasing IS’ success. 
It is both possible and 
necessary to control the idea 
space of the Internet and 
social media to prevent the 









domestic plots and 
attacks  
- Number of plots or 
attacks attempted 
by radicalized U.S. 
persons 
Consumption of media 
content from Islamist 
extremist groups is causally 
related to radicalization.  
 
 
139 House Homeland Security Committee, A National Strategy to Win the War against Islamic Terror, 6. 
140 Comey, “Fifteen Years after 9/11.” 
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Table 11 demonstrates how asking “why” repeatedly reveals various assumptions 
and conclusions that may otherwise have remained hidden. For each of the three workable 
objectives, their individual root cause diagram is presented along with their findings in 
Chapter IV. Table 11 is also very representative of the problems within all of CVE, not just 
messing. Often, desirously simple solutions and ideas are offered for what are truly 
complex problems. Buyer beware, such simplicity is often masking ignorance.  
F. APPENDIX B SUPPLEMENT—CATALOG OF IS MEDIA ASSETS 
REVIEWED 
1. Videos 
• Family Guy—Allah Akbar:  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sGKHV_D0EIE 
• 300:  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oJ6sGIjWXqM 
• Allah Akbar:  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OO7mAEeNRoo 




• Assassin’s Creed: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1nIN6Ciw1Ws 
• We Have the Swords: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1kRZnoYkVUc&list=PLYiK0Cagt_R
0ucRgnGUK0C7LTpMxPiLwY 
• Child Training Camp: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vzo1kgJ4Uh8&feature=youtu.be 
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• Orlando Attack: 
http://heavy.com/news/2016/06/official-isis-islamic-state-orlando-terror-
attack-english-video-youtube-mp4-download/ 






• Child Solider—8/20: 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BJVwY9LgPs4/?tagged=isis 
• Desert Soldiers: 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BJVwDhpABUU/?tagged=daesh 




• Child Eating Grapes: 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BJVM4O7gSY4/?tagged=isis 














• Candy Shop: 
http://heavy.com/news/2016/04/isis-islamic-state-candy-shop-baklava-
bakery-photo-report/13/  




• Battlefield Execution_2: 
http://heavy.com/news/2016/07/new-isis-islamic-state-daesh-amaq-news-
pictures-videos-syrian-arab-army-saa-beheading-full-video-screenshots/ 





• Dead Enemies_1: 
http://heavy.com/news/2016/08/new-isis-islamic-state-daesh-amaq-news-
pictures-videos-iraqi-army-soldiers-corpse-desecration-photo-report/ 
• Moral Punishment_1: 
http://heavy.com/news/2016/07/new-isis-islamic-state-daesh-amaq-news-
pictures-videos-had-hudud-adultery-adulterer-photo-report/ 






















APPENDIX C. LIST OF ITEMS REVIEWED FOR POLICY 
ANALYSIS, PROGRAM REVIEW, AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
U.S. NARRATIVE  
A. SPEECHES 
• President Obama, Speech on the Anniversary of 9/11: 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2014/09/11/remarks-president-911-memorial 
• President Obama, Remarks at the National Defense University: 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university  
• President Obama, Address to the Nation on the San Bernardino Terrorist 
Attack and the war on ISIS: 
https://www.cnn.com/2015/12/06/politics/transcript-obama-san-
bernardino-isis-address/index.html  
• President Obama, Speech on Combatting IS: 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/10/politics/transcript-obama-syria-isis-
speech/index.html  
• President Trump, Remarks on 9/11 Memorial Observance: 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/09/11/remarks-
president-trump-911-memorial-observance  
• President Bush, Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation: 
https://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html  
• President Bush, Remarks by President Bush on the Global War on Terror:  
https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ei/wh/rem/64287.htm  
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• Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, Remarks on American Leadership at the 
Council on Foreign Relations: 
https://www.cfr.org/event/remarks-american-leadership-0  
• Secretary of State John Kerry, Remarks at the Chicago Council on Global 
Affairs 
https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/10/263653.htm  
• Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Remarks to US Department of State 
Employees: 
https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/05/270620.htm  
B. EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND LEGISLATION 








• 114th Congress, HR 2899 CVE Act- and related S 2522, S 3456, HR 3075 
C. REPORTS 
• Countering Violent Extremist Act of 2015 Report 114-344 to Accompany 
HR2899 
• GAO Report to Congressional Requesters, “COUNTERING VIOLENT 
EXTREMISM: Actions Needed to Define Strategy and Assess Progress of 
Federal Efforts” 
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• Department of State and USAID Joint Strategy on Countering Violent 
Extremism (May 2016) 
• “A National Strategy to Win the War Against Islamist Terror,” House 
Homeland Security Committee 
• National Defense Strategy, 2018 
• National Security Strategy 2015 and 2017 
D. BUDGET DOCUMENTS 
• Office of Justice Programs FY2017 Budget at a Glance  
• U.S. Department of Justice FY2017 Budget Request National Security 
Fact Sheet 
• Matthew Weed, CRS Insight, Global Engagement Center: Background 
and Issues  
• Congressional Budget Justification U.S. Department of State FY 2016 
E. TESTIMONY 
• Nicholas J. Rasmussen, Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, 
“Countering Violent Islamist Extremism: The Urgent Threat of Foreign 
Fighters and Homegrown Terror,” Hearing before the House Committee 
on Homeland Security (February 11, 2015)  
• Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, Opening Statement on Counter-ISIL 
before the Senate Armed Services Committee (October 27, 2015)  
• Honorable Alberto M. Fernandez, Written Testimony Submitted to the 
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (July 
6, 2016)  
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• Michael Steinbach, Executive Assistant Director, FBI, Written Testimony 
Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations on the Federal 
Government’s Efforts to Monitor, Disrupt, and Counter Terrorist 
Propaganda with Particular Focus on the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant’s (ISIL) Online Communications (July 2016) 
• George Selim, Director of the Office for Community Partnership, DHS, 
Written Statement presented to the US Senate Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, Hearing: ISIS Online: Countering Terrorist Radicalization 
and Recruitment on the Internet and Social Media (July 2016)  
• Meagan M. LaGraffe, Chief of Staff, US State Department Global 
Engagement Center, Before the 114th Congress U.S. Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Permanent Subcommittee 
on Investigations (July 2016)  
• Professor Peter Bergen, New America, Written Statement presented to US 
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Hearing: ISIS Online: 
Countering Terrorist Radicalization and Recruitment on the Internet and 
Social Media (July 2016) 
• James B. Comey, Director FBI, Statement before the Senate Committee 
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, “Fifteen Years After 
9/11: Threats to the Homeland” (September 2016)  
F. WEBSITES 
• Global Engagement Center (U.S. State Department): 
https://www.state.gov/r/gec/  
85 
• Don’t Be a Puppet (FBI): 
https://cve.fbi.gov/home.html  
• Think Again Turn Around (video): 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-wmdEFvsY0E  
• International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE): 
http://www.icsve.org/topics/isis-defectors-speak-internet-memes/ (receive 
state department funding) 
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